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INTRODUCTION

This article focuses on Minnesota's underinsured motorist insurance coverage as an element of Minnesota's current, comprehensive automobile insurance system. More than any other aspect
of the modem Minnesota automobile insurance system, underinsured motorist coverage has undergone change. The changes have
not been minor; indeed the fundamental philosophical premise of
underinsured motorist itself has been radically altered over the
years. It is unlikely that any other state has as varied a history to its
underinsured motorist system as does Minnesota. This article also
attempts to identify several areas of tension which currently exist
within the underinsured motorist system. With the benefit of historical perspective, the article will describe the sources of that tension.
Determining the amount of underinsured motorist recoveries
is a function of several elements. One significant element is the
underinsured motorist system in place. Nationwide there are three
distinct underinsured motorist programs, each of which is capable
of yielding a different dollar figure for a given claim simply because
of the system's rules. At various times, Minnesota has utilized each
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol24/iss4/14
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of the three systems as its governing law. Currently, Minnesota has
a fourth, even more liberal, system in place.
Changing systems produces different results, not only in terms
of the dollar figure recoverable but even in terms of whether the
coverage is available at all. The rules which determine whether,
and in what amount, underinsured motorist coverage is available
bring into play the statutes as well as policy language. Fundamental philosophical premises underlying access to the first party underinsured (and uninsured) motorist insurance have been
changed. Case precedents which were reasonable and workable
under previous insurance systems do not meaningfully apply to
current cases involving underinsured motorist insurance.
Because underinsured motorist insurance is a first party coverto supplement the inadequate motoring liability inintended
age
surance of an at-fault tortfeasor, changes in the exposure of motoring tortfeasors (such as changes in joint and several liability rules)
have an impact upon the underinsured motorist coverage.
In an earlier era, when Minnesota's underinsured motorist law
embodied a system different from the present one, the Minnesota
Supreme Court carefully balanced the rights of the injured person,
the underinsured motorist insurer and the motoring tortfeasor
with the result that the Schmidt v. Clothier' procedure was set. This
procedure, named after the 1983 case, set certain mechanical rules
to be followed. The Schmidt v.Clothierprocedure, and the "right" of
the underinsured motorist insurer to substitute its own funds to
preserve a subrogation right, continues to play a major role in the
underinsured motorist system. In one sense, a current hotbed of
litigation involves whether the Schmidt v. Clothier procedures provide a meaningful subrogation opportunity for the underinsured
motorist carrier at a time when the current underinsured motorist
law is based upon a radically different type of underinsured compensation.
Minnesota is witnessing a new wave of litigation over underinsured motorist entitlement; much of that litigation involves the
struggle to apply, in a meaningful manner, precedents from an earlier underinsured motorist era. This paper explores some of the
issues and their origins in order to shed light on how the underin1. Since 1985, Minnesota has had a statutory "source" system for underinsured motorist claims. See Minn. Stat. § 65B.49, subd. 3a (1996).
2. 338 N.W.2d 256, 260-61 (Minn. 1983).
3. See id.
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sured motorist system is, or is not, working efficiently.
II.

EVOLUTION OF THE USE OF UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED

MOTORIST COVERAGES IN MINNESOTA'S AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
SYSTEM

Although Minnesota has for some years now required both un-

insured motorist (UM) and under-insured motorist (UIM) coverages to be part of automobile insurance policies for Minnesota
residents, that has not always been the case. Since the inception of
Minnesota's No-Fault Act in January 1975, Minnesota has been a
"compulsory insurance" state, requiring everyone who must register
4
a motor vehicle to secure certain types and amounts of insurance.
Before that time, Minnesota moved from a "financial responsibility"
system to become a "compulsory insurance" system.
Minnesota Statutes, section 65B.48 6 obligates vehicle owners to
obtain insurance (or to qualify as a self-insurer), while section
65B.49 specifies just what types and amounts of insurance coverages must be included in any such plan. During its evolution and
before the UM and UIM coverage became mandatory for residents,
Minnesota law imposed varying obligations upon insurers to acquaint consumers with optional coverages. The state thereby specified, to one degree or another, the scope of available coverage. At
different times, the insurance industry had to "make available" or
later "offer" certain optional coverages. Those were but steps in
the process of a slow movement toward
mandatory inclusion of the
S
8
UM and UIM coverages for residents.
4. See MINN. STAT. §§ 65B.41-.71 (1982).
5. These sections are known as the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act. See Schmidt, 338 N.W.2d at 260. It is a curious bit of word play that in a
financial responsibility system only motorists who have demonstrated that they are
irresponsible (meaning they have not been able to satisfy a motoring judgment
against them) are required to insure against future tort obligations. Those who
have not failed to respond to tort claims against them are, in such a system, presumed responsible and may drive without insurance.
6. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.48 (1996). "Every owner of a motor vehicle of a
type which is required to be registered or licensed or is principally garaged in this
state shall maintain during the period in which operation or use is contemplated...." Id.
7. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.49 (1996).
8. A non-resident owner of a motor vehicle is not required to maintain UM
and UIM coverages on the policy insuring the vehicle. See id. § 65B.48 (1). The
non-resident's policy need only afford the required levels of basic economic loss
coverage and bodily injury and property damage coverages while the vehicle is in
the state. An out-of-state policy will not be "written-up" to provide Minnesota UM

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol24/iss4/14
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UM coverage has been a mandatory coverage since 1967 and
was incorporated into the No-Fault Act when the Act became effective January 1, 1975." UIM coverage was introduced in the state in
1972 as an optional coverage that was required to be made available to policyholders. It was incorporated into the No-Fault Act in
1975 as an optional coverage that was required to be offered. The
coverage became mandatory in all policies issued or renewed after
October 1, 1985. All motor vehicles of a type required to be registered or principally garaged in the state are required to be insured
under a plan of reparation security affording UM and UIM coverages during the period when use is contemplated. 10 Although the
No-Fault Act requires bodily inju 7 (BI) liability limits of $30,000
per person/$60,000 per accident, the statutory limits for UM and
UIM coverages are only $25,000 per person/$50,000 per accident.12
There is no statutory 13requirement that an insurer offer increased
limits to policyholders.
All motorists subject to the state's control must carry minimum
limits liability (BI) coverage and they must have No-Fault or personal injury protection (PIP) coverage. The reasoning is that near
universal "no-fault" benefits protection is necessary to implement
Minnesota's No-Fault system. The nearly universal availability of
PIP benefits played a role in reducing access to the court system.
Also, minimum liability limits play a role in ensuring adequate
compensation. By contrast, the state seemingly has less of an interest in ensuring that non-residents, injured while traveling through
Minnesota, have UM or UIM coverage.

or UIM coverage under the No-Fault Act's statutory conformity provision. See id.
§ 65B.50. Out-of-state insurers licensed to do business in the state are only required to provide the minimum basic economic loss and liability coverages required by the Minnesota No-Fault Act while the vehicle is in the state. See Aguilar
v. Texas Farmers Ins. Co., 504 N.W.2d 791, 794 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (finding
that non-resident owners need only carry basic economic loss and residual liability
coverages); Hedin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 351 N.W.2d 407, 409 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1984) (stating that insurance companies licensed to transact business in
Minnesota are not required to "write up" nonresident policies to the Minnesota
statutory minimum); Cantu v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 535 N.W.2d 291, 292 (Minn. 1995),
reh'g denied, (Minn. Sept. 11, 1995).
9. See 1967 Minn. Laws ch. 837.
10. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.48(1) (1996).
11. See id. § 65B.49(3) (1).
12. See id. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(1).
13. See id. subd. 3a(3).
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Overview of UninsuredMotorist (UM) Coverage: A Substitutefor
Tortfeasor'sLiability Insurance

In financial responsibility systems (where only irresponsible
motorists are required to purchase liability insurance) many motor-

ists are actually unable to pay the tort judgments resulting from
their ownership or use of motor vehicles.1 4 Even under compulsory
liability insurance systems (where every motorist/owner is required
to insure against tort liability) there are always some vehicles operating without insurance. 15 Uninsured motorist coverage is intended
to provide, for the benefit of those who purchase it, a first party to
substitute for the liability insurance an at-fault motorist should have
had. 16 Basically, a UM carrier's obligation "is to pay, subject to its
policy limits, benefits [the insured] would otherwise have collected
in tort damages from the uninsured motorist."'
UM coverage is
"in effect a substitute for insurance that the tortfeasor should have
had."' 8
Minnesota's UM history is not complicated. UM coverage became a mandatory coverage in Minnesota in 1967.19 The statute
initially provided that the policyholder could reject the coverage,
but that provision was eliminated in 1969. 20 After adoption of the
No-Fault Act in 1975, UM coverage continued to be a mandatory

14. Interestingly, UM coverage was conceived by the insurance industry in the
1950s in response to pressure to adopt compulsory liability insurance. The industry sought to avoid having to insure all motorists at a time when, in most states, liability insurance was not mandatory. UM coverage has come to play a role in virtually all of the states whose systems mandate liability insurance. One way or
another, then, the industry ended up "insuring" against the tort liabilities of all
motorists in systems such as Minnesota's.
15. With no pretext at scientific surveying, twenty-plus years of practice convinces this writer that uninsured motorists are disproportionately involved in motoring accidents.
16. See McIntosh v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 488 N.W.2d 476, 478-79
(Minn. 1992) (citing 8C APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 5067.45, at 49-50
(1981)). Uninsured motorist coverage "more closely resembles.., a substitute
liability policy which stands as proxy for that which the uninsured motorist chose
not to carry." Id.
17. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Galloway, 373 N.W.2d 301, 305 (Minn.
1985). See also Brunmeier v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 296 Minn. 328, 331-32, 208
N.W.2d 860, 862 (1973) (finding that the legislature intended "to confer on
automobile liability policyholders benefits against uninsured motorists in no less
amount than such policyholders would have realized against insured motorists").
18. Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 181,189, 207 N.W.2d 348,
353 (1973). See also McIntosh, 488 N.W.2d at 478.
19. See 1967 Minn. Laws ch. 837.
20. See 1969 Minn. Laws ch. 630.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol24/iss4/14

6

Smetak: Underinsured Motorist Coverage in Minnesota: Old Precedents in a
1998]

UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE

coverage. In addition, insurers were required to offer optional UM
coverage to their policyholders so that the UM limits would equal
the liability limits selected by the insured. 2' Numerous "failure to
offer" claims arose. The mandatory offer statute was repealed on
April 12, 1980.22
B.

Overview of UIM Coverage: A FirstParty Supplement to Tortfeasor's
Inadequate Liability Limits

UIM coverage has its genesis in the inadequacies of uninsured
motorist legislation. It was conceived in the 1960s and was designed to provide protection for the risk that the damages sustained by the insured would not be adequately indemnified by the
liability coverage of the negligent insured motorist. If the offending motorist had at least the minimum liability insurance limits required by Minnesota but, if that BI limit was not sufficient to fully
pay the damages caused by that motorist, the motorist was underinsured. Underinsured motorist (UIM) is a first party coverage intended to supplement such inadequate BI coverage. Although
Minnesota's mandatory liability insurance limits are the highest of
any of the states, the damages sustained by the motoring public can
often exceed the limits of a minimally-insured ($30,000 per person/$60,000 per accident) tortfeasor. In other states with lower liability limits, it is even more likely that the damages will exceed the
available liability limits.
Some states chose to deal with the inadequately (but legally)
insured tortfeasor by modifying the state's uninsured motorist system. By changing the definition of "uninsured motorist" to encompass underinsured situations, some states have a single coverage. Minnesota has not used that method;23 uninsured motorist
and underinsured motorist coverages apply to separate risks in
Minnesota.
Whether the motorist is underinsured is pivotal in determining whether an injured person may access the state's UIM system.
Any statutory determination of when UIM coverage is applicable,
when the motorist is "underinsured," is generally predicated upon
See MINN. STAT. § 65B.49(6)(f) (1996).
22. See 1980 Minn. Laws ch. 539, § 7.
23. From 1985 to 1989, Minnesota combined the UM and UIM into a single
coverage limit. Basically, the two separate risks were covered jointly, subject to one
overall policy limit. Minnesota has never defined an uninsured motorist to include an underinsured motorist.
21.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1998

7

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 4 [1998], Art. 14
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

some type of comparison of the injured party's damages with the
tortfeasor's bodily injury (BI) liability insurance. A motorist is underinsured when he is insured but the amount of liability insurance
is not enough to compensate the injured person for the damages
sustained in the motoring accident.
Two principles remain constant and need to be understood
when considering whether a UIM claim exists:
1. The insured can never recover UIM benefits unless he or
she can establish that the tortfeasor is underinsured (i.e.,
the damages the tortfeasor is legally obligated to pay exceed the tortfeasor's BI limits);14 and

2. The fundamental character of UIM coverage, as an excess
coverage to liability insurance, has not been changed 5
Regardless of the date of loss, UIM coverage is not to be
treated as an alternative to liability coverage. It is an excess coverage.
Those two principles are basic and elemental under Minnesota's UIM system and under UIM concepts generally. These prin27
ciples go to the heart of the term underinsured. But, once any system is accessed (once there is an "underinsured motorist"),
different UIM systems provide differing levels of compensation. In

24. See, e.g., Richards v. Milwaukee Ins. Co., 518 N.W.2d 26, 28 (Minn. 1994),
reh'g denied, (Minn. Aug. 18, 1994) (finding that "actual damages" relative to an
underinsured motor vehicle is the total tortfeasor liability exclusive of the no-fault
coverage); Royal-Milbank Ins. Co. v. Busse, 474 N.W.2d 441, 443 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991) (holding that UIM benefits will only be paid when the "applicable bodily
injury liability policy is less than the amount needed to compensate the injured
party"); Brosdahl v. Minnesota Mut. Fire & Cas. Co., 437 N.W.2d 695, 697 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1989) (stating that UIM benefits may be claimed before pursuing a claim
against the tortfeasors).
25. See, e.g., Thommen v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 437 N.W.2d 651, 654 (Minn.
1989) (holding that UIM coverage provides any excess insurance protection to
which the insured is entitled); Onasch v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 444 N.W.2d 587,
590 (Minn. Ct. App.), rev. denied, (Minn. 1989) (stressing that UIM should only be
sought after settlement negotiations have taken place with the tortfeasor's insurer); Johnson v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 426 N.W.2d 419, 422 (Minn.
1988) (finding that UIM coverage is excess coverage, not optional protection).
26. See Onasch, 444 N.W.2d at 590.
27. A large factor contributing to the current tension in Minnesota's stillevolving UIM system can be traced to these factors. As explored in more detail
when discussing the "shifting of gap responsibility," there is a concern that Minnesota's current UIM system allows or compels the underinsured motorist insurance
to be used as if it were the underlying liability insurance. UIM theory would generally provide that UIM coverage is a supplement, not a substitute, for inadequate
liability limits.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol24/iss4/14
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part, the difference between the systems reflect differing public
policies. Just as states differ in terms of whether the coverage
should simply be "made available," be "offered," or become a mandatory coverage, so too do the various systems yield different underinsured motorist recoveries.
C. Variations in UnderinsuredMotorist Systems Generally
Nationwide there are three main variants, each its own "underinsured motorist system." They may be roughly characterized as
follows:
1. The Pure "Limits Less Limits" or "Difference of the Limits" Coverage Form. Under this kind of system, the UIM carrier's liability is measured by the lesser of: (a) the difference between
the UIM limits and BI limits or (b) the amount of uncompensated damages which exceed the BI limits. Recovery
under this system is possible only if the UIM limits exceed
the tortfeasor's BI limits. Another way of looking at such a
system is that its goal is to allow the injured purchaser of
UIM coverage to supplement the tortfeasor's liability insurance up to the level of compensation chosen when the UIM limit
was selected. The choices made by the purchaser of UIM
coverage, under this system, play a large role in fixing the
amount of UIM recovery. Under this system, if the injured
UIM insured chooses to settle for less than the motorist's
full liability limit, the consequences are borne by the claimant.
2. The Pure "Limits Less Paid" Coverage Form. The UIM carrier's
liability is measured by the lesser of: (a) the difference between the UIM limits and the amounts paid by the tortfeasor or (b) the uncompensated damages. This system is
somewhat like the "limits less limits" variety in that the goal
is to provide supplementation, if necessary, up to the injured person's pre-selected UIM limit. In such a system, the
UIM coverage supplements from the dollar figure paid by
the tortfeasor. (Note that even in this system, the offending
motorist must be underinsured in the sense that the damages must exceed the tortfeasor's liability insurance coverage. If the motorist has adequate insurance to pay the full
damages, the motorist is not underinsured and the UIM
coverage is not available.)
3. The Pure "Add-On" or "Damages Less Limits" Coverage Form.
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1998
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The UIM carrier's liability is measured by the lesser of: (a)
the UIM limits or (b) the damages less the tortfeasor's BI
limits. The UIM coverage is available, under such a system,
on top of the tortfeasor's liability limits. This system contemplates that the offending motorist's full liability limits
will be credited against the insured's damages. However, if
the tortfeasor's limits do not fully compensate the injured
person, that person's entire UIM limit is available as an excess reservoir of coverage. When selecting a UIM coverage
limit in such a system, the consumer is basically buying a
floating first party coverage, available on top of the tortfeasor's limit.
Minnesota's UIM system has undergone more change than
that in any otherjurisdiction. Its history is complex. Virtually every
aspect of a UIM claim depends upon the controlling law at the time
of the accident. During its UIM history, Minnesota has adopted
and used each and every one of the three basic UIM systems described above. To make matters even more complicated, in 1989
Minnesota adopted a hybrid fourth approach, one by which the entire UIM limit floats and supplements, if the motorist is underinsured, the amount paid by the tortfeasor. That is a "modified add
on" or "damages less paid' system. What should the injured person
with a qualifying injury claim caused by an "underinsured motorist"
recover? That seemingly simple question is like asking "how large
is a horse?" It depends upon whether the "horse" is a Clydesdale, a
quarter horse or a Shetland Pony. Each may be considered a horse
and yet there are major differences. Similarly, underinsured motorist coverage is very different depending upon which UIM system
is in place. And, in a rare state such as Minnesota, where each system has been in place at one time, the answer depends upon when
the accident happened. Each system has its own expectations and
processes; it creates its own dynamics. This article explores some of
the rules which have evolved and raises questions regarding
whether processes and procedures logical and workable under one
system have a meaningful place in any of the other systems.
An example will help illustrate the differences between the
three coverage forms (and Minnesota's current "fourth" form). Assume the following facts:
* The insured sustains damages of $40,000 in a motoring accident caused by a single, insured motorist.
• The tortfeasor's BI liability limits are $30,000.
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol24/iss4/14
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*

The UIM limits are $30,000.

The insured settles with the tortfeasor for $25,000 and
therefore has uncompensated damages of $15,000.
Depending upon which UIM system is in place, that one single
fact pattern produces a UIM recovery of zero, $5,000, $10,000 or
$15,000.
Using the "difference of limits" system, $30,000 less
$30,000 is zero. Using "damages less BI limits," $40,000 less
$30,000 is $10,000.
Using "UIM limit less paid," $30,000 less
$25,000 is $5,000. If "damages less paid" system is used $40,000 less
$25,000 is $15,000. Although the difference (zero to $15,000)
might seem slight, that is the range based upon a fairly small bodily
injury claim with small insurance limits. The difference between
the systems is staggering as the dollar sums and policy limits increase.
•

D. FourEras in the Evolution of UIM in Minnesota
What follows is a more detailed historical review of the various
UIM systems which Minnesota has had in place over time.
1.

"Differenceof Limits" UIM 1972 to 1975

From January 1, 1972, to January 1, 1975, when the No-Fault
Act was adopted, UIM coverage was a supplemental coverage that
insurers were required to "make available" to policyholders. 8 Under the statute, UIM coverage was premised on a pure "limits less
limits" system.29 If the UIM limits did not exceed the BI limits, no
UIM recovery could be made, regardless of the amount of damages
sustained.
In addition, the injured person was entitled to add together
the UIM limits under any insurance policy which identified the injured person as an insured. 0 "Stacking" of UIM (as well as UM)
coverages was permitted, despite policy language purporting to
prohibit stacking.3 This is a significant factor affecting access. The

28. See Jacobson v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 264 N.W.2d 804, 807 (Minn.
1978) (stating that policyholder must "opt in" to coverage made available, otherwise, he or she will not receive it).
29. See Lick v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 258 N.W.2d 791, 793 (Minn. 1977) (describing underinsured coverage relative to the recovering party's UIM coverage limits);
see alsoThiry v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 269 N.W.2d 66, 68 (Minn. 1978).
30. See Holman v. All Nation Ins. Co., 288 N.W.2d 244, 251 (Minn. 1980)
(finding that separately listed policy coverages may be stacked).
31. See id.
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premise upon which such "first party" coverages were made available emphasized that the coverage primarily insured the person as
opposed to the vehicle. Although the coverage was written on different vehicles, the coverage was viewed as available equally under
many policies at one time.
Under this "difference of limits" system, the UIM carrier was
allowed to deduct the tortfeasor's BI limits from the UIM limits.
The UIM limit chosen by the consumer acted as a benchmark. If
the motorist was validly insured but his/her liability limits were less
than that figure selected by the insured, the injured insured could
supplement the tortfeasor's liability limits in order to bring the total recovery up to the selected level of compensation.
Consider the motivation of an injured person under such a system. Irrespective of whether the injured person collected one
hundred percent of the tortfeasor's BI liability limits, the UIM
claim began where the BI limit left off. The injured person had no
incentive to settle for less than the BI limits. (That is a dynamic
which plays a major role in the current state of Minnesota UIM
law.) Although the appellate courts were not faced with "below
limits" settlement cases, it was clear that the claimant would "eat
the gap" resulting from such a settlement. This "difference of limits" law mandated a set-off equal to the full BI limits without regard
2
for the fact the insured may have settled for a lesser amount.3
2.

Add On or "DamagesLess Limits" UIM 1975 to 1985

Effective January 1, 1975, UIM coverage was changed from the
"limits less limits" format to a pure "add-on" coverage form." No
longer would the UIM recovery depend upon a difference between
the limits of the two policies. The UIM coverage limit was available
to "add on" to the BI limits if necessary to fully compensate the injured person who had the protection of UIM coverage. From 1975
to April 12, 1980, the so-called "mandatory offer era," UIM coverage was an optional coverage that was a part of a package that in34
surers were required to "offer" their policyholders.
(Note that a
mandatory offer may be viewed as one step beyond "make available." Such distinctions suggest the coverage is imbued with a

32.
33.
34.

See DiLuzio v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 749, 752 (Minn. 1980).
See Holman, 288 N.W.2d at 249.
See Act of April 11, 1974, ch. 408, § 9, 1974 Minn. Laws 762, 773, 774
(codified as MINN. STAT. § 65B.49(6) (e) (1974)).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol24/iss4/14

12

Smetak: Underinsured Motorist Coverage in Minnesota: Old Precedents in a
19981

UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE

higher degree of public policy.)
Because of the shift from the "limits less limits" to an "add on"
system, the courts of Minnesota began to see "below limits" settle5
ments. In Schmidt v. Clothier,1
the court held exhaustion clauses"
void and allowed insureds to settle with the tortfeasor's insurer for
an amount less than the liability limits. However, the insured had
to "eat the gap" between the liability settlement amount and the liability limits. The UIM carrier was entitled to set off the full BI
limits from the total damages.
Clearly, a disincentive was created by the application of the
"damages less limits" system. For example, if the insured chose to
settle at some figure less than the full BI limits, the insured absorbed the "gap" resulting from the below limits settlement when
making a UIM claim. The UIM coverage started where the BI coverage limit left off, regardless of what figure the insured chose to
accept in settlement.
The fact that the injured insured absorbed the "gap" resulting
from "leaving BI money on the table" resulted in comparatively few
settlements at substantially discounted figures. The gaps tended,
historically, to be small during this period of Minnesota's UIM history. (Note that the 3seminal
Schmidt v. Clothier doctrine was laid
8
down during this era.)
There were fewer UIM "substitutions" during this era as well.
For one thing, the settlements tended to be at or near the tortfeasor's BI limits. Also, the UIM insurer was given "credit" for the full
BI limits despite a below-limits settlement with the tortfeasor. As a
result, there was comparatively less incentive for UIM insurers to
"substitute" so as to pursue subrogation recoveries.
During the mandatory offer period, the insurer had the burden of proving 39that it.. had made a commercially reasonable offer of
UIM coverage. If it failed, UIM coverage would be written into
the policy by operation of law. 4° Numerous failure to offer claims
arose. The problems resulting from the mandatory offer provision,
including the burden of proof and standards to be applied in determining whether a valid offer had been made (and the fact that
35. 338 N.W.2d 256, 263 (Minn. 1983).
36. An exhaustion clause provides that no claim may be made against the
UIM policy unless and until the full BI limits are exhausted.
37. See Schmidt, 338 N.W.2d at 261.
38. See infranote 55 and accompanying text.
39. See Holman v. All Nation Ins. Co., 288 N.W.2d 244, 249 (Minn. 1980).
40. See id. at 250.
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imposed coverages would be "stacked") inevitably led to repeal of
the mandatory offer statute on April 12, 1980.41
From April 12, 1980 to October 1, 1985, there were no statutes
which either defined or described the scope of UIM coverage in
Minnesota. Many insurers did not offer the coverage. If UIM coverage did not appear on the declarations page of the policy and the
insured could not establish that a premium was paid for UIM cov42
erage, no claim could be made.
For those insurers that continued to offer UIM coverage after
repeal, the UIM system was considered to remain the same. Minnesota courts continued to apply the legal principles developed
under the repealed statutes to UIM coverage after repeal. Thus,
UIM coverage, to the extent it was contained in the policy, remained an "add on" type coverage and would be stacked. 43 Policy

terms were enforced only to the extent consistent with the principles developed under the repealed statute. 44
3. "Limits Less Paid"UIM-The Broton 45 Era: October 1, 1985 to
August 1, 1989
In 1985, rising insurance costs, which had been traced in part
to the prior law requiring expansive interpretation of automobile
insurance coverages, resulted in major revisions to UM and UIM
law.46 UIM coverage was elevated to a mandatory coverage. The
most significant change was the legislature's attempt to return the
calculation of UIM benefits to a "limits less limits" basis from the
"add on" coverage that had existed since 1975. The initial bill contained an exhaustion requirement which would have obligated the
insured to exhaust the tortfeasor's liability insurance (BI) coverage
41. See Hauer v. Integrity Mut. Ins. Co., 352 N.W.2d 406, 408 (Minn. 1984)
(describing the elimination of the "mandatory requirement that insurers offer underinsured coverage to their policyholders").
42. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Levinson, 438 N.W.2d 110, 115-16
(Minn. Ct. App. 1989); see also Lundgren v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 391 N.W.2d 542, 545
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
43. See Hoeschen v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 349 N.W.2d 833, 838 (Minn. Ct.
App.), aff'd on other grounds, 378 N.W.2d 796, 800 (Minn. 1984).
44. See Derhaag v. Continental W. Ins. Co., 370 N.W.2d 467, 469 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985), afj'd, 381 N.W.2d 443, 443 (Minn. 1986); see also Sobania v. Integrity
Mut. Ins. Co., 371 N.W.2d 197, 200 (Minn. 1985).
45. See Broton v. Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 428 N.W.2d 85, 90 (Minn.
1988).
46. See Hanson v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 417 N.W.2d 94, 96 (Minn.
1987).
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before turning to the UIM coverage. The adoption of such a provision would have returned Minnesota to the "limits less limits" system used from 1972 to 1975.
However, through the amendment process, the exhaustion
clause was deleted. What inevitably emerged was a "limits less paid"
system. The UIM carrier's liability was measured by the lesser of:
(a) the difference between the UIM limits and the amounts paid by
the tortfeasor or (b) the uncompensated damages. As a result,
UIM benefits could not be collected if the injured person recovered an amount equal to or in excess of the BI limits from the tortfeasor.4 s
In addition, the 1985 legislation had the following effects:
1. UM and UIM coverages became a combined single coverage;
2. UM/UIM coverages could no longer be stacked;
3. Primary responsibility for the "gap" (i.e., the difference
between the BI limits and the liability settlement amount)
was shifted from the insured to the UIM carrier;
4. A statutory priority or "Source" system for payment of UM
and UIM claims was created, one which exists to this day,
and
5. A geographical restriction which prevented an insured
from recovering UM or UIM benefits while occupying an
owned but uninsured vehicle was imposed.
Under the 1985 law, an insured was still allowed to settle with the
tortfeasor for an amount less than the tortfeasor's BI limits. There
was, as noted, no exhaustion requirement. However, under the
1985 law, the primary responsibility for the "gap" was shifted to the
UIM carrier.49 This was a reversal of the majority opinion in Schmidt
v. Clothier,50 which had placed responsibility for the "gap" on the insured.

47. See Broton, 428 N.W.2d at 90; see also Kothrade v. American Family Mut.
Ins. Co., 462 N.W.2d 413, 417 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
48. See, e.g., Broton, 428 N.W.2d at 90; Roberts v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 428 N.W.2d 91 (Minn. 1988); Kothrade, 462 N.W.2d at 415; Thompson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 412 N.W.2d 386, 388 (Minn. Ct. App.), rev. denied, (Minn. 1987);
Ballavance v. Safeco Ins. Co., 432 N.W.2d 185, 189 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), rev. denied, (Minn. 1989).
49. See Broton, 428 N.W.2d at 89-90.
50. 338 N.W.2d 256, 261 (Minn. 1983).
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4. Minnesota'sPresent 'Damages less Paid,"a Modified Add On
UIM Law: Accidents After August 1, 1989
Less than four years after its last major revamping of UIM law,
the legislature once again amended the statutes. The major features of the 1989 legislation included:
1. UIM coverage was converted into a modified "add-on"
coverage form;
2. UM and UIM coverages were once again separate coverages with separate limits, and
3. In cases involving multiple defendants, a UIM claim may
be made where any one of the motoring tortfeasors fit
within the definition of an "underinsured motor vehicle."'"
It is important to recognize that Minnesota's present UIM system, the result of the 1985 and 1989 changes, is not the same "add
on" coverage which existed from 1975 to 1985. Under that system,
the UIM carrier was only responsible for uncompensated damages
which were in excess of the tortfeasor's BI limits. The UIM carrier
was entitled to deduct the underlying BI limits from 52the damages,
regardless of whether the full BI limits had been paid.
Under the 1989 law, an insured was still allowed to settle with
53
the tortfeasor for an amount less than the tortfeasor's BI limits.
Whether a UIM claim could always be made and whether the UIM
carrier would be responsible for the "gap" in all cases was an open
issue under the 1989 law as well as under the 1985 law. The Nordstrom case suggests that the answers to these issues may depend on
whether the insured made the "best possible settlement" with the
tortfeasor's BI carrier.54 In any event, it is clear that a UIM carrier
is not automatically entitled to deduct the underlying liability limits
from the damages, as it was from 1975 to 1985. As the case law
presently stands, the UIM carrier is only entitled to deduct the
amounts paid to the insured by the tortfeasor.
In this sense, the present UIM system can most appropriately
be described as a "damages less paid" system. The UIM carrier's
51. This was a legislative reversal ofJohnson v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co.,
426 N.W.2d 419, 422 (Minn. 1988).
52. See Schmidt v. Clothier, 338 N.W.2d 256, 261 (Minn. 1983).
53. See Onasch v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 444 N.W.2d 587, 590 (Minn. Ct.
App.), rev. denied, (Minn. Oct. 25, 1989).
54. See Employers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nordstrom, 495 N.W.2d 855, 857 (Minn.
1993).
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potential liability is measured by the lesser of: (a) the UIM limits or
(b) the total damages less the amounts paid by the tortfeasor.
E. Comparison of Minnesota's "Old" and "New" UIM Systems: Of Gap
Shifting and ChangingDynamics
As noted above, over time, four different UIM systems have
passed across the landscape of Minnesota. But, like glaciers, not all
have left the same impression. Two systems are much more important than the others. One is the "Add-on" (or "damages less limits") system. The other is the current "Modified Add-on" system
under which the damages are reduced not by the BI limit but by
the amount "paid" to the injured motorist. Both UIM systems deal
with an "underinsured motorist" situation where the at-fault motorist has inadequate liability insurance to pay the injured person for
all of their recoverable damages. But the two systems are fundamentally different in terms of the UIM insurer's exposure. Also,
the dynamics within each system differ.
Current UIM law is the post-1989 "damages less paid" system.
However, the case law rules which are being applied to determine
the rights and responsibilities of the parties to the current UIM system were in significant part laid down during the earlier "damages
less limits" era. One of the most important procedural "rules" was
laid down during the earlier pure "add-on" system: the Schmidt v.
Clothier5 rule. That is an important rule because at the time it was
decided, Minnesota had no appellate law addressing the respective
rights of the UIM claimant (to consider settlement of her tort claim
in such a way as to avoid forfeiting UIM coverage) and the UIM insurer (to be able to pursue "subrogation" to recover any payments
it made to the injured person from tortfeasors.) In deciding
Schmidt v. Clothier, the Minnesota Supreme Court carefully considered the competing purposes of the parties affected by a UIM issue
and weifhed the workings and objectives of the then-current UIM
system.
The system has changed in a dramatic way since Schmidt
57
v. Clothier. At the time, the injured party who decided to settle
with a tortfeasor for less than the liability limits did so at his or her
55. 338 N.W.2d at 260-61. The Schmidt court held "that the underinsurer is
liable only for the amount of damages suffered by the insured in excess of the liability limits of the defendant." The underinsurance claim was thus not dependent on the conditions of any eventual settlement. Id. at 261.
56. Id.
57. See supranotes 51-55 and accompanying text.
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peril.5 The "gap" between the full BI limits and the settlement was
9 and the UIM insurer was given credit
absorbed by the claimant,
60
limits.
BI
full
for the
As a result, the court found it significant that an injured motor
vehicle victim would have incentive to obtain substantially all of the
BI limits. After all, any cost of accepting less was borne by the injured party; the UIM insurer could not complain. The UIM insurer
received full credit for the amount of the limits, paid or not. Thus,
the UIM insurer's objection to below-limits settlements was not
given much weight at the time of Schmidt v. Clothier.6
Today, Minnesota's UIM system is radically different. Under
current law the "gap" may be and often is shifted from the claimant, who decides on the settlement amount, to the UIM insurer.
This "shifting of responsibility for the gap" plays a dramatic role
and is a major source of the tension within Minnesota's UIM system. The
next section discusses
•
1
62 the impact of the shift by comparing Minnesota's "old" UIM law with the "new" UIM law.' Significantly, those rules and procedures for handling UIM claims and
underlying tort claims were laid down during the Schmidt v. Clothier
era.64 Although these rules still exist today, problems arise when the
rules are applied in today's system."'
One single factor, shifting the responsibility for the gap, has
played a major role in creating the turmoil which currently exists in
Minnesota. This era of Minnesota's UIM history has seen an explosion of "below limits" BI settlements because an insured could proceed with a UIM claim despite agreeing to a settlement. One of the
most striking differences between the two laws is the potential impact of the "gap." Where the insured "eats the gap," few cases are
58. See Schmidt, 338 N.W.2d at 261.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. Id.
62. "Old" UIM law here refers to that in effect at the time of Schmidt v. Clothier, 1983. At that time, Minnesota had a pure add on UIM system.
63. "New" here refers to the modified add on system in effect since 1989.
64. 338 N.W.2d at 260-61.
65. The term "problems" is not intended to pass value judgment upon one
system or another. The "problems" which appear today involve more UIM litigation, more objections to UIM claims, more denials of entitlement to UIM coverage
and the related confusion as to how the UIM insurer may or may not pursue recovery. All of those "problems" are relatively unique to the current UIM system,
having been largely worked out satisfactorily during the Schmidt v. Clothierera. The
imbalance between the workings of the two systems plays a role in virtually all of
the listed dispute areas.
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settled with substantial discounts. 66 However, if the UIM insurer
must "pay the gap," then the insured loses incentive to pursue the
tortfeasor's BI insurer for the full BI limits. As the gaps grow, the
UIM insurer resists paying for damages which "should have been
paid by the BI insurer." Each system, then, has its own dynamics.
The "old" role of UIM provided a reservoir of coverage available to the extent that the tortfeasor's BI limits were inadequate.
Rather than exhausting the BI coverage and then pursuing recovery from the tortfeasor's assets, the injured person could resort to
the UIM coverage. The UIM coverage did not come into play except to the extent that the damages exceeded the BI

limit.

At

what figure the claimant chose to settle was comparatively unimportant at that time; choosing to settle at a discount did not penalize the underinsured motorist insurer. 68
Under the "old" UIM law, if the injured person chose to settle
below the BI limits, the "gap" was absorbed by the claimant; the
UIM coverage applied at the same dollar level, equal to the tortfeasor's BI limits.
Many UIM claims are contested today because if the motorist is
truly underinsured (liability limits are inadequate to fully compensate the injured motorist) the UIM insurer objects that it must
"drop down" so as to pay for damages which are below the BI limit.
The seemingly simple shifting of responsibility for the "gap"
has, more than anything else, caused the greatest amount of tension in Minnesota's UIM system. To avoid paying for damages
which should have been paid by the BI insurer, UIM insurers strive
harder to avoid coverage obligations. In addition, under the current system, there may well be more "substitutions." The UIM insurer often "substitutes" its own money equal to the tentative BI settlement in order to preserve rights to subrogation against the
remaining, unpaid BI coverage limits. That practice has led to confusion as to the procedures to be followed after substitution. Does
the substitution prevent a settlement so that the BI case should
proceed? Can the UIM claim be processed immediately or must it
66. The obvious self-interest of the injured party to obtain maximum recovery
for him/herself ensures that if settlement below limits would penalize the injured
person, they would logically try to obtain as much as possible from the BI insurer.
67. 338 N.W.2d at 260-61.
68. To the contrary, if the injured party chose to settle for less than 100% of
the liability limits, the UIM insurer could pursue subrogation (after making UIM
payment) against the BI limits which were "left on the table" as a result of a belowlimits settlement.
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await some further resolution of the underlying tort claim? Is the
subrogation handled in the name of the UIM insurer as subrogee
or in the name of the original injured party? What if the ultimate
assessment of liability and damages differs from that assumed when
the tentative settlement was reached? Fortunately, courts have answered some of the above questions. The remainder of this paper
addresses certain of the unanswered and evolving issues.
Other factors have caused tension in Minnesota's UIM system
as well as the "gap" issues discussed above. Access to UIM coverages has been fundamentally changed over the years. UIM coverage no longer primarily follows the person. Instead, after 1985,
UIM coverage is more closely linked to the vehicle. That, in turn,
not only determines what UIM coverage is or is not available but
validates policy exclusions which were invalid under earlier UIM
systems.
In addition, the underlying tort liability climate has changed.
Most importantly, joint and several tort liability rules have changed.
Because the motorist's tort liability is the cornerstone 69 for determining the UIM insurer's obligation, changes in the tort system
impact the UIM system. The topics examined include the following:
* Is the At-Fault Vehicle "Underinsured?"The defining characteristic of an "underinsured motorist" is that the actual
damages, recoverable by the injured person, exceed the liability limits. How is that comparison made when there are
multiple claimants, each of whom has a conflicting claim
against the liability limits? What if there are multiple tortfeasors, each of whom has a separate tort liability insurance
policy amount? Even more fundamentally, what if the atfault vehicle is one which is owned by the injured party? By
that person's family members? (This involves the role of

69. The interesting role of tort caps is beyond the scope of this paper. But see
Ronning v. Citizens Sec. Mut. Ins. Co., 557 N.W.2d 363, 365 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996)
(finding that the government vehicle exclusion to a UIM policy was void as against
public policy). Limiting municipal tort liability to $200,000 did not preclude an
insured, whose damages exceeded that amount, from recovering underinsured
motorist (UIM) benefits in connection with an accident involving a governmentowned vehicle. See id. at 366; see also MINN. STAT. § 466.04 (1994). In 1997, the
statutory limit for municipal tort liability was increased to $300,000. See MINN.
STAT. § 466.04(1) (a) (1) (Supp. 1997). Minnesota will likely soon have to address
whether the tort liability cap of an owner of a rental vehicle will limit the UIM
claim. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.49(5a) (i) (2) (1996).
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exclusions to the UIM coverage: whether the exclusions are
valid or void. That brings into play the conceptual basis of
the "risk" which has been insured: is the offending vehicle
one which, for various reasons, should not be considered
underinsured so as to allow the injured party to recover
UIM benefits?)
* The State's Source system. In 1985, a fundamental shift took
place. Not only did the legislature eliminate "stacking" of
UM and UIM coverages, the legislature altered the connection between the individual and the policy in other ways.
Those changes dictate different UIM results and render certain case law doubtful when applied to the "new" UIM system.
* The relationshipbetween the tort system and the UIM system. This
relationship is examined briefly, with emphasis upon certain key areas where there is currently tension in the system.
Great progress has been made in understanding the procedural requirements before a UIM claim may be made. It is
now clear that the underlying BI claim must proceed to tort
judgment or to the "tentative settlement" stage before a
UIM claim may be presented. But, beyond that, what about
developments in the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
arena? Are the methods which are increasingly being used
to resolve the underlying BI claim consistent with the fact
that there is another party, the UIM insurer, who has rights
flowing from the tort claim? Finally, this section examines
a seemingly simple concept: how does one calculate the
damages which an insured is "legally entitled to recover"
from a tortfeasor? Does that figure differ when a UIM claim
is made? Has a new wrinkle been introduced: the abolition
of "jointand several liability" when a UIM claim is made?
III. IS THE AT-FAULT VEHICLE UNDERINSURED? ISSUES INVOLVING
THE COMPARISON OF ACTUAL DAMAGES WITH LIABILITY LIMITS

It is axiomatic that before a UIM claim may be asserted, the
motor vehicle or motorcycle which caused the injuries must be underinsured as defined in the system. As the Minnesota Supreme
Court has observed: "That the motor vehicle which causes the injury falls within [this] definition is, of course, necessary to invoke
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Despite the change from an "add-on" coverage to a "limits

less paid" coverage in 1985 and the subsequent change back to a
"modified add-on" form of coverage in 1989, the definition of an
"underinsured motor vehicle" has always mandated a comparison
of the insured's damages and the tortfeasor's liability limits since
the Act was introduced in 1975. 7' If the insured cannot establish
that the negligent motorist was "underinsured,"7 2 no recovery of
UIM benefits can be made regardless of which UIM system happens to be in place.
This simple precondition to recovering UIM benefits, whether
the motorist is underinsured, starts with a comparison of the tort
damages which the injured person is legally entitled to recover with
the tortfeasor's limit of insurance. In the simple case with one injured person and one at-fault motorist, the answer is easily determined. But what if there is more than one BI limit applicable to
pay the tort liability of that single motorist? More than one tortfeasor? Multiple claimants who share, and thus exhaust, the liability
insurance? There is an issue that is only recently surfacing having
to do with the role 'joint and several liability" should play in the
UIM area. Finally, there is a more fundamental, philosophical issue: what if the at-fault vehicle is not owned and driven by a
stranger? This latter issue has seen a fair amount of litigation; the
issue is phrased in terms of whether a family-owned vehicle exclusion or a geographic exclusion is enforceable or whether there is
an underinsured motor vehicle.
A.

What are "actualdamages?"

One element in the test, the phrase "actual damages," refers to
the damages the insured is legally entitled to recover from the tort70. Broton v. Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 428 N.W.2d 85, 89 (Minn. 1988);
see also Brosdahl v. Minnesota Mut. Fire & Cas. Co., 437 N.W.2d 695, 697 (Minn.

Ct. App. 1989).
71. See Royal-Milbank Ins. Co. v. Busse, 474 N.W.2d 441, 443 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991); see also Wondra v. American Family Ins. Group, 432 N.W.2d 455, 460 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1988), rev. denied, (Minn. 1989).
72. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.43(17). Section 65B.43, subdivision 17, which became effective October 1, 1985, specifically defines an underinsured motor vehicle

as follows:
Underinsured motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle or motorcycle to
which a bodily injury liability policy applies at the time of the accident
but its limit for bodily injury is less than the amount needed to compensate the insured for actual damages.
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feasor. 7 Actual damages, for purposes of UIM, refer generally to
the amount of money which the injured person is legally entitled to
recover from the at-fault motorist. In applying the statute, the total
damages are first reduced by the no-fault benefits paid or payable
and any collateral source off-sets. Afterwards, damages are further
reduced to reflect the injured party's comparative fault.74 Net
damages are then compared to the tortfeasor's liability limits. 75
The tortfeasor is underinsured
only if those actual damages exceed
76
the available BI limits.
Logically, there ought be little or no difference whether actual
damages are calculated under the tort system or under the UIM
system. After all, the UIM coverage is intended to act as a first party
supplement to the tortfeasor's liability insurance.7 7 The benchmark
refers to the tortjudgment for which the at-fault motorist is underinsured.
B.

To what "limit" are the actual damages compared to determine whether
a motorist is underinsured?

The damages must exceed the tortfeasor's automobile insurance limits in order for the motorist to be considered underinsured. A tortfeasor is not underinsured if the judgment is less than
the tortfeasor's BI limits. 7 If there is only one motorist, and if
there is one applicable liability insurance policy, the comparison is
relatively simple. Do the actual damages which the injured person
is legally entitled to recover exceed that single liability limit? But is
there just one BI "limit?" There may be several insurance policies
which together comprise the automobile liability insurance and
thus create the dollar limit which the damages must exceed before
the motorist is underinsured. For example, if a vehicle is negligently driven by a non-owner with the permission of the owner,
there are often two automobile liability insurance limits which apply to the tort claim.79 The motorist would not be underinsured
73. See Richards v. Milwaukee Ins. Co,. 518 N.W.2d 26, 28 (Minn. 1994), reh'g
denied, (Minn. Aug. 18, 1994).
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See Richards,518 N.W.2d at 28.
78. See Costello v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 472 N.W.2d 324, 326 (Minn. 1991)
(denying UIM claim where jury award in the tort suit was less than BI limits).
79. Typically, the vehicle owner's liability coverage applies. The policy is written to provide for tort liability "arising out of" the ownership, maintenance or use
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unless the damages exceed the combined limits of the liability insurance on that motor vehicle. An even simpler, although less
common, example involves a vehicle owner/operator who carries a
standard automobile insurance policy and an excess liability or
umbrella insurance policy.
Umbrella policies duplicate and
broaden the coverage which standard automobile insurance affords. If the combined insurance of the automobile policy and the
excess liability policy is sufficient to pay for the victim's damages,
then the motorist is not underinsured. In short, to determine if a
motorist is underinsured, the collectible damages are compared
with the automobile and applicable excess automobile insurance
limits.
The application of the statutory definition of an underinsured
motor vehicle becomes somewhat more complex when there are
multiple claimants, vicariously liable parties, multiple tortfeasors or
non-motoring tortfeasors. These issues are addressed below.
1. Multiple Claimants
How should the threshold definition of underinsured be applied when a motorist injures several persons? Consider, for example, that one single motorist (with minimum $30,000 per person
liability insurance/$60,000 per accident) injures four people. If
each person has $35,000 in damages, one can conclude that the
motorist is underinsured. After all, the $35,000 damage figure exceeds the $30,000 per person liability limit as to each injured person. But what if each person's injuries were valued at $25,000? If
one compares each individual's damages and the "per person" liability limit, none of the injured people could make an underinsured motorist claim. Is that how the comparison should be made?
The statute does not address the possibility that a tortfeasor's
liability limits may be distributed among multiple claimants, leaving
some individuals under-compensated in circumstances where, by
some standard, the motorist was underinsured. By comparing the
damages to the limits of liability rather than to the coverage which
is actually available, the underinsured definition creates an issue to
of the motor vehicle. MINN. STAT. § 65B.49 subd. 3(2). The driver's automobile
liability insurance policy typically applies when the driver operates another nonowned vehicle with permission. Such "drive other car" coverage offers the insured
protection against motoring tort liability for casual, infrequent use of non-owned
vehicles. Both policies apply to the same tort claim resulting from negligent driving of the vehicle.
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whether the full per person limits are to be compared to each person's damages or whether the per accident liability limits are to be
compared with the collective damages sustained by all injured persons.
In Kothrade v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company,80 the
Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the appropriate comparison
in multiple claimant cases is between the damages collectively sustained by the injured claimants and the tortfeasor's per accident liability limits." This interpretation of the threshold underinsured
requirement neither expands the UIM beyond the use contemplated in the insurance system nor prevents access where it is reasonably necessary to fulfill the underinsured purpose.
2.

Vicariously Liable Parties

Often automobile liability insurance applies not to the active
fault of the motorist but instead protects the vicariously liable
owner from tort liability. In a common case where an owner allows
another to drive his or her car, two liability insurance policies may
be available-that of the owner and that of the driver. Both the
owner's automobile liability insurance and the driver's automobile
liability insurance afford the kind of primary coverage which UIM
is intended to supplement. Logically, then, a UIM claim exists only
if the damages exceed the combined liability limits applicable to a
single vehicle. In order to be underinsured, therefore, the insured's actual damages must exceed the total amount of liability
protection available to the active tortfeasor and to any vicariously
liable party.82

All liability policies which insure the negligent operation of
the tortfeasor's vehicle are considered in determining underinsurability. Thus, in addition to the owner's coverage, the liability
coverage available to the operator of the vehicle, to the tortfeasor's
employer or to any other vicariously liable party will be considered.
This approach is consistent with the conceptual basis of underinsured motorist coverage. Coverage is accessed only if there is not
enough liability insurance available to pay for damages caused by a
80.
81.

462 N.W.2d 413 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
Id. See also Ballanger v. Toenjes, 362 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. Ct. App.) (holding

that a suit by multiple claimants was properly settled within the policyholder's per
accident liability limits), rev. dismissed, (Minn. 1985).
82. See Royal-Milbank Ins. Co. v. Busse, 474 N.W.2d 441 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991).
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negligent motorist.
3.

Multiple Torifeasors

Underinsured motorist coverage is necessary only when insufficient liability insurance exists to compensate for the motoring injury. The definition of underinsured motorist requires one to
compare the recoverable damages to the underinsured motorist's
liability limits. With that premise in mind, what if there is more
than one at-fault motorist? Is there an underinsured motorist claim
in such a case?
The answer depends upon two variables. When examining
Minnesota precedents in the UIM area, one must keep in mind
that there have been changes at different times in the UIM "system" and in the 'Joint and several liability" rules. First of all, does
the UIM system contemplate that coverage is available only if the
combined limits of all tortfeasors are inadequate to fully compensate the injured person? Or does the UIM system allow a UIM
claim to be made if the damages exceed the tort liability limits of
one single tortfeasor, without regard for the existence of other insured motoring tortfeasors?
Until 1989, Minnesota required that damages exceed the combined liability limits of all jointly and severally liable tortfeasors. In
1989, Minnesota changed the law to allow a UIM claim whenever
any one motorist of several was underinsured.8 3 As a result of this
change in the law, pre-1989 and post-1989 claims differ.
Second, when aggregating the liability limits of several motoring tortfeasors, the implicit assumption has been that each motorist
is jointly and severally liable to the injured person. From that flows
the assumption that all of the liability insurance of all such tortfeasors is available to compensate, as primary coverage, the tort damages of an injured person. The fundamental concept, whether the
motorist is underinsured, requires comparison of the damages with
available liability limits.
Total actual damages, in isolation of tort liability for those
damages, is meaningless. 814 Similarly, the total of the motorists' tort
liability insurance is meaningless unless the total of those liability
83.
84.

See MINN. STAT. § 65B.49, subd. 4a (1996).
See Richards v. Milwaukee Ins. Co., 518 N.W.2d 26, 28 (Minn. 1994) (stat-

ing that to trigger a UIM claim, total damages must be reduced by comparative
fault and by appropriate set-offs to yield a dollar sum for which the tortfeasor is

legally liable).
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policies is actually available to pay toward the damages. That, in
turn, depends upon whether the several motorists are fully jointly
and severally liable for the actual damages.
During most of Minnesota's UIM history, a motorist with only
one percent of the comparative fault could have judgment entered
against him or her for 100% of the total damages.8 5 But that rule
has changed. A motorist with only one percent comparative fault is
no longer jointly and severally liable for the full damages. As a result of this change in the statute, certain cases applying pre-1988
joint and several liability principles cannot be meaningfully applied
to more recent accident claims.
After August 1, 1988, motorists with nominal degrees of fault
have been liable only for four times the actual percentage of fault
attributed to them.86 In such a case, it is not helpful to compare
the total damages recoverable from all tortfeasors to a specific tortfeasor's BI limits, because such a tortfeasor may be liable only for a
fraction of that amount. Put another way, it is not logical to add
the total amounts of the liability limits for each of several motoring
tortfeasors if only a fraction of those limits, the amount available to
pay a tort judgment, is available to pay to the injured person. Accordingly, if one must decide whether a motorist is "underinsured,"
logic dictates that one should analyze a tortfeasor's liability coverage with the joint and several liability law in mind.
For example, if one of two motorists is ten percent at fault, has
$30,000 of liability insurance and the total damages of $60,000, that
motorist would not be considered underinsured. When the tort liability of that partially at-fault (ten percent) motorist is assessed, his
degree of fault is less than that which would make him fully jointly
and severally liable for one hundred percent of the damages. Instead, applying Minnesota's joint and several liability statute, that
motorist could never be responsible for more than $24,000.87 Be85. See Johnson v. American Family Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 426 N.W.2d 419
(Minn. 1988). The Johnson court held that a motor vehicle would be considered
underinsured only where the insured's damages exceed the "combined liability
limits of all tortfeasors." Id. at 423. Johnson, a passenger in a school bus, was injured when the bus collided with an automobile. Id. at 419. The bus had
$1,000,000 in liability limits, and the automobile had $100,000 in BI limits. Id. at
420. Because Johnson's damages did not exceed $1,100,000 (the combined BI
limits of both tortfeasors) Johnson did not have a UIM claim because neither motorist was underinsured. Id. at 422.
86.

See MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subd. 1 (1996).

87. This figure can be calculated as follows: ten percent of fault times four is
forty percent. Forty percent of the $60,000 damages is $24,000.
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cause that motorist has, in this example, $30,000 of liability insurance, he is not underinsured. The damages this tortfeasor is legally
obligated to pay are less than his available bodily injury liability insurance limit. Therefore, that motorist would not be underinsured.
By contrast, the second motorist in the example above (ninety
percent at fault) would be fully jointly and severally liable for one
hundred percent of the damages. If the liability limits of the second motorist are not enough to pay all of the tort damages, that
motorist is underinsured. His or her BI limits are not enough to
pay the tort judgment which could be entered against that motorist.

A court performs this joint and several liability analysis after
the jury makes findings of fault. While UIM coverage is, generally
speaking, intended to provide a first party source to pay the uncompensated amount of a tort judgment which exceeds the liability
limits of a motoring tortfeasor, not all tortjudgments automatically
translate into the amount of the UIM insurer's obligation. In "conversion" and "family auto exclusion" cases discussed above, the
amount of the judgment is not dispositive of the UIM insurer's obligation. The judgment, although binding on a tortfeasor, is
merely the starting point. If recovering the tort judgment from the
UIM insurer would essentially "convert" inexpensive UIM coverage
into additional BI coverage, some part of the judgment is not recoverable from the UIM insurer. 88
a. Multiple Tortfeasors: Before the 1988Joint and Several Liability
Change and Before the August 1, 1989 UIM Law Change
In Johnson v. American Family Mutual Automobile Insurance Company,89 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a motor vehicle can
be considered underinsured only where the insured's damages exceed the "combined liability limits of all tortfeasors." 0 The claim in
Johnson arose out of a 1978 accident.9 ' The school bus in which the
Johnson boy was riding swerved into a ditch in order to avoid an il92
legally parked automobile. The bus was insured for liability cov88. See Lahr v. American Family. Mut. Ins. Co., 551 N.W.2d 732 (Minn. Ct.
App.), rev. denied, (Minn. 1996).
89. 426 N.W.2d 419 (Minn. 1988).
90. See id. at 423.
91. See id. at 419.
92. See id.
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erage in the amount of $1,000,000, and the automobile was insured
with liability limits in the amount of $100,000.9

Johnson's guard-

ian ad litem commenced suit against both drivers and eventually
settled with the automobile insurer for the liability limits of
$100,000. 94 Johnson also
released the bus's liability insurer in con95
$35,000.
of
sideration

These amounts did not adequately compensate Johnson for his
injuries. Johnson's guardian ad litem then commenced a UIM arbitration proceeding against Johnson's UIM insurer, American
Family. 96 Johnson's guardian ad litem contended that American
Family was required to pay damages to the extent they exceeded
$135,000, the amounts paid by the tortfeasors. 9' American Family
asserted that they were entitled to set-off the combined liability limits,
and since Johnson's damages did not exceed that amount, UIM
coverage was not available.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals disagreed with American
Family's position, stating that liability for UIM benefits is "measured by the amount by which the injured party's damages exceed
the liability insurance limits of the primary culpable defendant."99 The
court of appeals reached this conclusion, in part, by noting that the
1978 definition of an underinsured motor vehicle suggested that
the limits of liability of only one vehicle should be used because it
made "reference only to the other vehicle. "' The Minnesota Supreme
Court reversed.'01 Noting that at the time of the accident each tortfeasor remained jointly and severally liable for the entire award, the
court denied entitlement to UIM benefits, stating:
Underinsured motorist coverage is not an alternative to liability coverage ....
Because Johnson's damages did not
exceed the combined liability limits of all tortfeasors, the
93. See id. at 420.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. Johnson v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 413 N.W.2d 172, 177 (Minn.
Ct. App.) (emphasis added), rev. granted, (Minn. 1987). The term "primary culpable defendant was coined by the court of appeals; it is not in the statute. See also
Boehm v. Citizens Sec. Mut. Ins. Co., 414 N.W.2d 232 (Minn. Ct. App.), rev. denied,
(Minn. 1987); Koranda v. Austin Mut. Ins. Co., 397 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986), rev. denied, (Minn. 1987).
100. Id. at 176 n.1. (emphasis in original).
101. See Johnson, 426 N.W.2d at 422.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1998

29

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 4 [1998], Art. 14
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

vehicles were not really underinsured .... [The] only way
for the under insurance concept to have any consistency is
to consider the liability limits of all tortfeasors in determining the amount recoverable by an injured insured.
Since each could be liable for the entire amount, the li102
ability insurance limits of each must be considered ....
As noted above, Johnson's accident occurred in 1978. What
about the 1985 legislative changes? The fundamental nature of
UIM coverage, which compensates injured persons for damages
sustained in excess of the available liability limits, was not altered by
the 1985 legislation. 13 Consequently,
Johnson would apply to claims
1 4
governed by the 1985 laws.

0

b. Multiple Tortfeasors: After the August 1,1988Joint and Several
Change
Application of Johnson to claims arising out of accidents occurring prior to August 1, 1988, posed no problem. The full combined liability limits of all tortfeasors had to be considered because
even a small degree of fault made the motorist fully liable for any
judgment. In such a case, an underinsured motorist claim was determined by comparing the damages to the total available liability
insurance from all tortfeasors because each was fully jointly and
severally liable. However, applying Johnson to claims arising on or
after August 1, 1988, was complicated by the 1988 amendment to
Minnesota Statutes section 604.02. Under that statute, a tortfeasor
had to be at least fifteen percent negligent before he or she could
be liable for the whole award. 105 A tortfeasor whose fault was less
than fifteen percent could only be liable for four times the percentage of fault attributable to that person.106
A determination of whether a motor vehicle is underinsured
must include or consider, therefore, the respective percentages of
fault of each tortfeasor under the joint and several liability statute.
An underinsured motor vehicle should be deemed involved whenever the injured claimant's damages exceed the combined limits of
102. See id.
103. See Onasch v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 444 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. Ct. App.),
rev. denied, (Minn. 1989).
104. SeeJunker v. Allstate Ins. Co., 489 N.W.2d 821, 823 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
105. See MINN. STAT. § 604.02 (1996).
106. See id. From this comes the phrase "four times fifteen" as a reminder that
those tortfeasors with relatively nominal, 15% or less, fault can only be required to
pay "four times" the amount of their actual percentage of fault.
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bodily injury liability that are actually available to the claimant after
proper application of joint and several liability principles. For example, if one tortfeasor is less than fifteen percent at fault for an
accident, Minnesota Statutes section 604.02 would prevent the injured insured from collecting the full liability limits of that tortfeasor. The portion of the liability limits of the marginally culpable
tortfeasor that is unavailable to the insured should not be considered in determining whether there is an underinsured motor vehicle.
c. Multiple Tortfeasors: After the August 1, 1989, UIM Law
Change
Effective August 1, 1989, Minnesota Statutes section 65B.49,
subdivision 4a was amended to provide that " [i] f a person is injured
by two or more vehicles, underinsured motorist coverage is payable
whenever any one of those vehicles meets the definition of underinsured motor vehicle in section 65B.43, subdivision 17. ",107 After
1989, then, a motorist is underinsured if that individual motorist is
liable to the injured party and if the damages for which that motorist is liable exceed the available liability insurance limit for that
tortfeasor. The legislature apparently sought, by this amendment,
to overrule the holding inJohnson.
But what if the amount of that "other" motorist's tort liability
(whose tort obligation was determined with joint and several liability principles in mind) includes some damages which should have
been insured under the BI coverage of the same policy under
which the UIM claim is made? Would that be improper "conversion?"
Lahr v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company,108 arose after
the 1988 joint and several liability change and after the 1989
change which allowed an injured party to make a UIM claim whenever any one motorist was underinsured. In Lahr, the Minnesota
Court of Appeals held that applying joint and several liability was
improper
for determining whether the motorist was underin109
sured.
Lahr was a passenger in one automobile when it collided
107. MINN. STAT. § 65B.49, subd. 4a (1996) (emphasis added).
108. 551 N.W.2d 732 (Minn. Ct. App.), rev. denied, (Minn. 1996).
109. See id. at 735. The question is whether Lahr represent the first shot in a
volley of new litigation over the joint and several status of underinsured motorists
(with a separate standard than that used in the underlying tort/liability insurance
and even in the uninsured motorist arenas) or whether Lahr is simply another
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with another." ° Lahr claimed underinsured motorist coverage
from American Family as insurer of the car in which Lahr was riding." Lahr's damages were $290,000.1 2 Peura, the driver of Lahr's
car, was ninety percent at fault, and the other driver, Kvisto, was
only ten percent at fault."3 Peura's liability insurer paid its $50,000
BI limit; Kvisto's
liability insurer settled under its $100,000 BI limit
4
for $80,000.1

Lahr could not, of course, argue that Peura was an underinsured motorist for purposes of collecting under Peura's UIM coverage. That would be blatant "conversion" of UIM into BI.
American Family had paid the liability insurance coverage on the
occupied vehicle but objected to paying its UIM coverage to passenger Lahr.' 6 Lahr claimed, however, that Kvisto was an "underinsured motor vehicle" entitling Lahr to recover UIM coverage
from American Family, based upon joint and several principles."'
The issue presented in Lahrwas whether Kvisto, the other motorist, was underinsured." 8 Kvisto's percentage of fault, ten percent, amounted to $29,000."" Ifjoint and several liability principles
were applied, however, Kvisto would be liable for more than that
ten percent of the total damages.
Lahr argued that if Kvisto were
jointly and severally liable for four times Kvisto's ten percent of
fault, then Kvisto could be liable for $116,000.
Lahr further argued that since this $116,000 exceeded Kvisto's liability limit of
$100,000 Kvisto should be considered an underinsured motorist for
purposes of accessing Peura's UIM coverage.122
The court of appeals refused to allow Lahr to recover UIM
coverage under the same policy which had paid its BI limits to

"conversion" case.
110. See Lahr,551 N.W.2d at 732.
111. See id. at 732-33.
112. See id. at 733.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. Of course, if Lahr had her own insurance policy, nothing would have prevented her from supplementing the inadequate BI coverage of host Peura from
Lahr's own UIM coverage.
116. See Lahr, 551 N.W.2d at 733.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id.
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her. 12 ' Although the opinion contains statements which, if taken
literally, seem to disallow the use of joint and several principles in
any UIM claim, the court's underlying concern involved "conversion." The court noted, "The use of Peura's liability to trigger UIM
coverage violates the underlying policy of Myers and Thommen. Accordingly,
the district court erred in applying joint and several li14
ability." '

One reading of Lahr, consistent with the "conversion" cases, is
simply that the court of appeals was not willing to allow a passenger
to collect both BI and UIM payments for the same risk (i.e., the
negligent driving of host Peura). Allowing Lahr to collect both
benefits could well be recognized as "conversion" since the ninety
percent of fault attributable to Peura would form the basis for payment under both coverages. The objection to conversion is to prevent applying two separate coverages, BI and UIM, to the same risk.
The dissent in Lahr would have applied joint and several principles, thereby allowing passenger Lahr to recover up to the
amount of damages ($116,000) for which Kvisto would be jointly
and severally liable, reduced by the BI payment made by Kvisto's
insurer.

Lahrwill likely be revisited in other cases where the application
of joint and several liability will not result in shifting fault from the
host driver to the other, potentially underinsured, driver. For example, consider if Lahr had been injured while riding in Peura's
car when it collided with two other cars. Assume that each of the
three vehicles had equal fault, thirty-three and one-third percent
each. Would Lahr limit the UIM claim to one-third of the total
damages or would the joint and several liability of the other two
motorists form the basis of the UIM claim? This question is thus far
unanswered. But future cases involving Lahr will reveal what role
joint and several liability plays where there are multiple tortfeasors
and how, in that context, the UIM exposure should be calculated.
C. When is the At-Fault Underinsured Vehicle Not "Underinsured?"
The dollar sum of a tort judgment will not always automatically
translate into an underinsured motorist recovery. Rather, Minnesota courts have struggled to draw a line beyond which it would be
123.
124.
125.

See id. at 734-35.
See id.
See id. at 735.
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improper to allow a passenger to collect both the liability insurance
on the vehicle and to collect UIM coverage for the same negligent
driving.
In many ways, the role of underinsured motorist coverage in
Minnesota parallels the role of tort liability insurance. Both types
of insurance generally derive from and obligate the insurer to pay
the amount of damages that an injured person is legally entitled to
recover from a motoring tortfeasor. Underinsured motorist coverage is a first-party coverage which provides a supplement to inadequate tort liability insurance coverage. Liability coverage, on the
other hand, is a third-party coverage. The liability insurer commits
to pay to a third person (i.e., the injured claimant) the damages
which he or she is legally entitled to recover as a result of the fault
of the insured motorist.
It is important to note that both types of coverage apply to a
specifically insured "risk." Tort liability insurance, in Minnesota,
primarily follows the vehicle. In particular, since 1985, the insured
risk has been primarily linked to the insured vehicle. The concept
of "risk" is fundamental to insurance; shifting of identifiable "risks"
is what insurance is about. Significantly, some risks are excluded
from both the BI and from the UM and UIM coverages. 126 A few of
these risks are discussed below.
In the liability insurance area, Minnesota has regularly enforced language which prevents the extension of a policy's liability
protection from one vehicle (owned and insured by the insured) to
another, if that other vehicle is also owned by the insured. The
reason behind this approach is to prevent an insured from extending the insurance on one vehicle to many vehicles that should be
insured separately. Consequently, language which prevents this extension or conversion of liability coverage from one vehicle to several has found its way into virtually all automobile liability insurance policies. The language used to prevent this extension is
typically found in an exclusion which has come to be referred to as
the "family auto exclusion." Although the exclusion first came
about in the liability coverage, it has come to be used in uninsured"' and underinsured motorist policies.
126. See McIntosh v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 488 N.W.2d 476, 479-80
(Minn. 1992) (ruling that an injury which results from being intentionally run
down with an automobile is not a risk covered under the liability (BI) policy or the
UM or UIM coverages).
127. By enforcing the exclusionary language of the "family auto exclusion" or

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol24/iss4/14

34

Smetak: Underinsured Motorist Coverage in Minnesota: Old Precedents in a

1998].

UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE

The same exclusionary concept, the "family auto exclusion,"
has been dealt with in the underinsured motorist coverage area. At
its simplest, the exclusion prevents the insured vehicle, covered by
the liability coverage in the amount selected by the owner, from
also being1. treated
as an underinsured motor vehicle under the
128
same policy.

If the at-fault vehicle was another vehicle owned by

the insured, the exclusion was easily applied. In less clear-cut cases,
however, Minnesota courts have struggled to balance shifting public policies. Before the 1985 statutory changes to the UM/UIM system, both UM and UIM policies were deemed to essentially follow
the person and not the vehicle. Thus, before 1985 Minnesota law
allowed the "stacking" of all UM or UIM coverages available to a
person under several potentially available policies. At some point,
however, these policy objectives shifted; allowing recovery of the
UM or UIM coverage became unacceptable.
Minnesota's UIM history, in terms of its application to the family auto exclusion, shows the struggle as the courts have tried to apply these shifting policies. More recently, the appellate courts have
come to recognize that the post-1985 statutes not only validate the
family auto exclusions, but impose the limitation even in the absence of an exclusion or limitation in the insurance policy.
1.

The "FamilyAuto Exclusion"

a. Roots of the "FamilyAuto Exclusion" in Liability Coverage:
Exclusion of Risks Resultingfrom Other Owned, Non-Insured Vehicles
In most instances, a liability policy is issued for the ownership
and use of a specific owned automobile. Automobile insurers have
regularly included language in standard automobile policies denying coverage when the accident results from an insured's use of
another owned vehicle. For example, the policy may specify that:
We do not provide liability coverage for the ownership,
maintenance or use of:
Any vehicle, other than the Described Vehicle which

the restrictive definition of "uninsured motor vehicle," Minnesota courts prevented a vehicle owner from purchasing one liability policy and effectively extending it to other vehicles which were owned but uninsured.
128. The court often explains that it is necessary to apply the exclusion to prevent the "conversion" of inexpensively obtained underinsured motorist coverage
from serving as additional liability coverage on the same vehicle.
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is owned by you or furnished or available for your
regular use.
Such an exclusion has been upheld both before and after passage of the No-Fault Act. The validity of the exclusion derives from
the fact that the main risk insured is the ownership/operation of
the designated vehicle. Because of this basic risk-based premise
underlying liability insurance, such limitations on coverage have
routinely been enforced. In 1973, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
stated "without this limitation a person could purchase just one
policy on only one automobile and thereby secure coverage for all
the other vehicles he may own or vehicles the members of his family own while residents of the same household.""'
Minnesota courts have rejected all challenges to the validity of
this type of exclusion when applied to either a named insured, or
to family members who operate a vehicle they own or have available
for their regular use.' 3 ' The courts have concluded that the risk involved in the ownership or use of another owned motor vehicle
should be insured under a policy issued for that vehicle.
The basic risk-based premise underlying liability coverage and
setting effective limits upon the scope of the liability coverage has
not changed. If anything, evolution to a compulsory insurance system which compels each owner of a motor vehicle to obtain automobile liability insurance supports enforcement of exclusions.
While recognizing that no-fault benefits and uninsured motorist
benefits had been payable under the same circumstances at that
33
time, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated in Toomey v. Krone.1
"The Minnesota No-Fault Act has not altered the basic framework
of liability law. The premise underlying no-fault and uninsured
motorist coverage is first-party in nature,
as opposed to third-party
14
coverage involved in the instant case.

3

The Minnesota Supreme Court enforced the exclusion in
Toomey, preventing the liability coverage from extending to another

129. Limpert v. Smith, 203 N.W,2d 29, 32-33 (Wis. 1973). See also Gunderson v.
Classified Ins. Corp., 397 N.W.2d 922, 925 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Boedigheimer v.
Taylor, 287 Minn. 323, 329, 178 N.W.2d 610, 614 (1970).
130. See Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. VanDoren, 424 N.W.2d 791, 794-95

(Minn. Ct. App.), rev. denied, (Minn. 1988).
131. SeeToomeyv. Krone, 306 N.W.2d 549, 550 (Minn. 1981).
132. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
133.

Toomey, 306 N.W.2d at 550

134.

Id.
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owned uninsured vehicle.
The Toomey holding underscores one
of the key differences between liability coverage (which primarily
"follows the vehicle") and first-party coverages (such as no-fault, uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage) that, in the past,
tended to "follow the person."
b. Liability Insurance:Exclusion of Risks Resultingfrom Operation/
Use of Other Vehicles Regularly Furnishedor Availablefor Use
The same "family auto" exclusion set out above serves a dual
purpose. Not only does the exclusion prevent liability coverage
from applying to risks from operating other owned vehicles, it also
prevents coverage under one policy from extending to the insured's use of another vehicle which is available for the regular use
of that person.
Understanding the conceptual basis by which Minnesota applies the family auto exclusion in the liability insurance area helps
one understand the enforcement of a comparable family auto exclusion in the UM and UIM coverage areas. The term family auto
exclusion is more aptly applied in its original setting: it serves as an
exclusion from the liability coverage of an automobile policy. The
excluded risks are usually associated with other vehicles owned or
regularly used by the named insured or by other family members.
In most instances, the automobile liability insurance is written for a
specific vehicle.
Most policies extend to the named insured, including family
members, liability insurance protection when operating other vehicles, as long as doing so does not extend the vehicle-based liability
insurance from one owned vehicle to another owned vehicle.
From that premise, it has been only a short reach to exclude liability coverage for other vehicles owned by family members of the
named insured and also other vehicles not owned by, but furnished
or available for regular use of, those same parties. The purpose of
the exclusion "is to prevent coverage of two
or more automobiles
3 6
when only a single automobile is insured.",

c. The "FamilyAuto Exclusion" in Uninsured and Underinsured
Motorist Coverage
Almost every standard automobile policy contains provisions
135.
136.

See id.
Boedigheimerv. Taylor, 287 Minn. 323, 327, 178 N.W.2d 610, 613 (1970).
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that are designed to prevent the improper conversion of the relatively inexpensive first-party UM and UIM coverages into additional
liability protection for the benefit of the vehicle owner or tortfeasor. One such provision, commonly referred to as the "family auto
exclusion" specifically defines an uninsured or underinsured motor
vehicle to exclude any vehicle owned by, furnished, or available for
the regular use of the named insured or any family member.
The family auto exclusion has accounted for much litigation in
the UM and UIM contexts largely because the exclusion applies to
two separate situations. First of all, the exclusion prevents the insured vehicle from being considered an underinsured motor vehicle under the same policy. For example, in a one-car accident a
passenger has a claim against the negligent driver, triggering the BI
coverage written for that risk. If the passenger could also collect
under the policy's UIM coverage, the inexpensive UIM coverage
would be converted into extra BI coverage for the protection of the
negligent owner. The owner would receive twice the BI coverage
for little more than one BI premium. An improved version of the
exclusion would simply state that the term "underinsured motor
vehicle" does not include the insured vehicle; instead, some other
vehicle must be involved in order to trigger the UIM risk.
Second, the family auto exclusion prevents the extension of
one policy's BI coverage from the insured vehicle to another vehicle which should have been separately insured by the policyholder
or one of his or her family members. UIM coverage is cheaper
than comparable limits of BI coverage. The Minnesota system contemplates that each owner should insure each vehicle with liability
coverage. If the named insured could recover the UIM coverage
from one policy on vehicle A so that it became, in effect, "BI coverage" on a second vehicle owned by the named insured, the owner
would have insured vehicle B with extra liability coverage without
paying for it. Without the exclusion, inexpensive UIM coverage
could be converted into BI coverage.
The family auto exclusion is most often litigated when the insured seeks to collect UIM coverage which should have been purchased as BI coverage by a member of the insured's family. At
some point, it is inequitable to allow the family-owned vehicle to be
treated as an "underinsured motor vehicle." Just where the line
should be drawn has been influenced heavily by prevailing public
policy factors.
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Wintz v. Colonial Insurance Company of California"s7 directly addressed the question of whether exclusionary clauses, such as the
family auto exclusion, were valid or void. Wintz involved a claim for
uninsured (UM) motorist coverage by Linda Wintz. 11 Wintz was
injured while riding on an uninsured motorcycle driven by her
husband but owned by her son (who did not live with them)."'
Emphasizing the "rule that coverage follows the person" but not
the vehicle, the court of appeals had refused to deny Linda Wintz
UM coverage under her and her husband's automobile policy despite a provision that the UM/UIM coverage did not apply to vehicles which were "owned by or furnished or available for the regular
use" of the named insured or a relative. 14° The Minnesota Supreme
Court reversed, and in so doing articulated the pre-1985 and post1985 dichotomy as follows:
Before 1984, Minnesota courts relied on Nygaard v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 301 Minn. 10,
221 N.W.2d 151 (1974), to determine the outcome of
such cases. This court held in Nygaard that "uninsured
motorist protection is not coverage for vehicles but for
persons.... ." Id., 221 N.W.2d at 157.

In 1985, the legislature amended Minn. Stat. section
65B.49, subd. 3a(7) (Supp.1985) to allow insurance companies to exclude certain vehicles from uninsured motorist coverage if the vehicle was owned by the policyholder,
but not insured by the policyholder. See Act of May 21,
1985, ch. 168, § 11, 1985 Minn. Laws 459, codified at
Minn. Stat. section 65B.49, subd. 3a(7) (Supp.1985).
After that amendment, this court heard Petrich v. Hartford FireInsurance Company, 427 N.W.2d 244 (1988). Relying on Myers, we said: " Myers... rests on the principle
that vehicle owners may not purchase first party coverage
and expect it to function as liability protection. The concern is not the creation of additional liability coverage,
but the conversion of one type of insurance into another."
Petrich, 427 N.W.2d at 246.
To void an exclusionary clause where the vehicle was
"owned by or furnished or available for the regular use of'
the first-party beneficiary would allow a policyholder to in137.
138.
139.
140.

542 N.W.2d 625, 626 (Minn. 1996).
See id.
See id.
Id. at 627.
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sure only one vehicle, and gain coverage on any/all other
uninsured vehicles. This would convert first-party benefits
of an insurance policy into third-party liability benefits. 4 '
In Myers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company,1 a
seminal case in this area, a passenger was killed in a vehicle owned
by Stein and driven by 144another. 43 The..car ran off the side of the
road and struck a tree.
After collecting the liability coverage on
the car, the •decedent's heirs
sought UIM
•
145 coverage under the same
policy for the same negligent conduct.
The policy excluded the
insured vehicle from the definition of an underinsured motor vehicle by providing that an underinsured motor vehicle would not include any vehicle "owned by or furnished or made available for the
regular use of you [i.e., Stein] or any family member."' 46 The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the provision and denied benefits,
stating:
Underinsured motorist coverage is a first-party coverage
and, in that sense, the coverage follows the person not the
vehicle. Here, however, the decedent passenger's heirs
have already collected under the liability coverage of the
insurer of the Stein car. To now collect further under the
same insurer's underinsured motorist coverage would be
to convert the underinsured motorist coverage into thirdparty insurance, treating it essentially the same as thirdparty liability coverage.

The policy [exclusion] ...

pre-

vents this conversion of
first-party coverage into third7
party liability coverage.1

The same result was reached in claims involving UIM coverage
that was imposed by148operation of law• under
the 1975 to 1980 man•149
Insurance Group,
Farmers
Illinois
v.
Meyer
In
statute.
offer
datory
even in the absence of any contractual language, the "exclusion"
was applied. 50 As a matter of public policy, the concept of under-

141.
142.

Id. at 626-27.
336 N.W.2d 288, 289 (Minn. 1983).

143.

See id.

144.

See id.

145.

See id.

146.
147.
148.
1985);
(Minn.
149.
150.

Id. at 290.
Id. at 291.
See Meyer v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Group, 371 N.W.2d 535, 537 (Minn.
cf Eisenschenk v. Millers Mut. Ins. Ass'n of Illinois, 353 N.W.2d 662, 665
Ct. App. 1984), rev. denied, (Minn. 1985).
371 N.W.2d 535, 536 (Minn. 1985).
See id. at 536.
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insured motorist coverage could not be extended to the owned vehicle 5or
to others which fit within the scope of a family auto exclu1
sion.1

The 1985 legislation created a statutory priority or "source" system for payment of UM and UIM claims whereby the first level of
priority is the coverage insuring the "occupied" vehicle. 52 In Synstelien v. State Farm Automobile Insurance Company,153 for example, the
court of appeals erroneously concluded that Meyer and Myers (the
case relied on by Meyer) were no longer valid because their continwould prevent an.15"occupant" from recovering 5UIM
ued application
114
benefits.
In Thommen v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Company, on
the other hand, the supreme court held that 1985 amendments did
15 6
not affect the validity of Myers and rejected the Synstelien analysis.
In Thommen, the policy on the occupied vehicle excluded the57
insured vehicle from becoming an "underinsured motor vehicle."
Several passengers sought UIM coverage under that policy after
118
The court noted that the 1985
collecting its BI coverage.
amendment did "not change the fundamental character of UIM
coverage [and therefore] the rationale for the Myers decision is
equally valid today .... 59

In Linder v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company,'
Jennifer Linder, a minor, was struck by a pickup truck owned by
her father which was driven by her brother. All Were residents of
the same household. 162 Linder collected the liability coverage on
the policy insuring the truck and conceded that Myers prevented
her from collecting the UIM coverage of that same policy.16 3

In-

stead, she made claim for UIM benefits under separate policies is-

151. See id.
152. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(5) (1996).
153. 418 N.W.2d 530 (Minn. Ct. App.), rev. granted, (Minn. 1988). See Broten
v. Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 428 N.W.2d 85, 86 (Minn. 1988) (disposing of issue
that was the basis of the review granted in Synstelien v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co.).
154. See Synstelien, 418 N.W.2d at 532.
155. 437 N.W.2d 651, 652 (Minn. 1989).
156. See id. at 654.
157. See id. at 653.
158. See id. at 652.
159. Id. at 654.
160. 364 N.W.2d 481 (Minn. Ct.App.), rev. denied, (Minn. 1985).
161. See Linder v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 364 N.W.2d 481, 482 (Minn.
Ct. App.), rev. denied, (Minn. 1985).
162. See id.
163. See id. at 483.
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sued to her father which insured other vehicles.' 64 These policies,
however, provided that UIM coverage would not apply to injury
"through being struck by a land motor vehicle owned
by the named
65
insured or any resident of the same household.'1
Although Linder was not seeking UIM benefits from the same
policy that had afforded the BI coverage, the court of appeals enforced the exclusion. 66 To invalidate the exclusion would convert
the UIM coverage into additional liability protection for the family,
and "underinsured motorist coverage is not designed to relieve an
insured or,,167his family from the failure to purchase adequate liability
coverage.
In Petrichby Lee v. HartfordFireInsurance Company,168 the Minnesota Supreme Court applied the "family auto exclusion" in the context of a UM claim. Gary Lee's stepson, Paul Petrich, was injured
while riding in an uninsured pickup truck owned by Lee.' 69 Lee
had two other vehicles which were both insured by Hartford. Petrich sought UM benefits under that policy.
The policy excluded
UM coverage if the accident arose out of an uninsured vehicle
which was "owned by or furnished or available
for the regular use
171
of... [Gary Lee] or any family member."
Petrich argued that the Myers line of cases were inapplicable
because in Myers and its progeny, the plaintiff had first collected liability coverage and then attempted to collect UIM benefits on the
same policy or additional policies carried by the tortfeasor. 72 In essence, Petrich argued that the courts that applied Myers were- only
prohibiting a doubling of the liability limits, a situation which could
only occur where the claimant first collects under the third party
liability coverage; not where the only vehicle involved was uninsured.
The supreme court disagreed and held the exclusion was
enforceable:
The Myers rule arises out of a fact pattern where the same

164.
165.

See id. at 482.
Id.

166. See id. at 483.
167. Id. at 483. See also American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Luhman, 438 N.W.2d
453, 453 (Minn. Ct. App.), rev. denied (Minn. 1989).
168. 427 N.W.2d 244, 245 (Minn. 1988).
169.
See Petrich, 427 N.W.2d. at 245.
170.
See id.
171. Id.
172.
See id. at 246.
173.
See id. at 246.
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person owns the at-fault vehicle and the policy under
which the injured claimant seeks first-party coverage. Recovery in this situation inevitably compensates the owner
who failed to adequately insure one of his vehicles. Such
is the case for Gary Lee, who owns and declined to insure
the car that caused his stepson's injury, and also owns the
uninsured motorist policy covering his stepson ...
Myers... rests on the principle that vehicle owners may
not purchase first party coverage and expect it to function
as liability coverage.... If anything, the prohibition
against conversion established in Myers, an underinsured
case, is even more complete here where the car owner has
purchased no liability 74coverage at all on the vehicle involved in the accident.
1. The "Family Auto Exclusion" In Separate Insurance Policies
Not Issued to the Tortfeasor
In Great American Insurance Company v. Sticha,175 two tortfeasors
caused an accident in which Sticha was injured. 76 The accident occurred in 1983 at a time when the injured party was allowed to collect 'jointly and severally" from either of the two tortfeasors.
Sticha's wife, one of the tortfeasors, was eighty percent at fault.
Meyers, the second tortfeasor, was twenty percent at fault. 1 77 The
Sticha court focused upon the "family" auto and allowed the UIM
claim. The court quoted with approval "[i] t is well-established that
first party coverages for which an insured pays a premium follow
the person, not the vehicle. Policy exclusions which attempt to
prevent the coverage from following the person are inconsistent
with purposes of the Minnesota No-Fault Act." 178
In DeVille v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company,
Mrs. DeVille was injured while a passenger on her husband's mo-

174. See id. See also Vieths v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 441 N.W.2d 575 (Minn.
Ct. App.), rev. denied, (Minn. 1989) (holding that children injured while on their
father's uninsured motorcycles when the motorcycles collided with each other
were not entitled to UM coverage under their father's policies insuring noninvolved automobiles).
175. 374 N.W.2d 556 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
176. See Sticha, 374 N.W.2d at 557.
177. See id.
178. See id. at 558 (quoting American Motorist Ins. Co. v. Saravela, 327 N.W.2d
77 (Minn. 1982)).
179. 367 N.W.2d 574 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
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Her husband was solely responsible for the accident.
torcycle.
182
That
her
cars.
Mrs. DeVille had a separate policy of insurance on
policy excluded a vehicle "furnished for the regular use of you,
your spouse or any relative" from becoming an underinsured mo-4
exclusion.18
tor vehicle. 11 Mr. DeVille's motorcycle fell within that
• . 185
The court
The court of appeals refused to enforce the exclusion.
limited Myers to situations "where the passenger had first collected
the liability limits from the tortfeasor and then attempted to collect
UIM coverage on the same or additional policies carried by the
tortfeasor himself., 186 UIM benefits were therefore payable.
Perfetti v. Fidelity & Casualty Company 87 reached a similar result.
In this case, Theresa Perfetti was injured while riding in an unin188
Both Theresa
sured automobile driven by her brother, Steven.
and Steven lived with their father, who had a separate Fidelity policy insuring his vehicle.89 The Fidelity policy contained an exclusion which provided that its UM coverage would not apply to "bodily injury sustained by any person while occupying... any motor
vehicle owned by [the policyholder] or any family member which is not inThe court invalidated the
sured for this coverage under this policy.
exclusion and distinguished Myers by stating:
Perfetti is not attempting to collect first-party benefits under the policy of the person who owned or insured the "atfault" vehicle. She was injured in a vehicle owned by, but
left uninsured by, her brother when he swerved to avoid
an oncoming vehicle and struck a telephone pole. She
has no third-party liability claim against her father, but
merely claims uninsured motorist benefits under his policy. The exception based on prohibiting the conversion
of first-party coverage into third-party coverage is therefore inapplicable.19

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

See DeVille, 367 N.W.2d at 575.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 559.
Id. at 577.
486 N.W.2d 440 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
See Perfetti, 486 N.W.2d at 441.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 443.
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,

.

192

In Linder v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company,
(a 1977 accident) and American Family Mutual Insurance Company v.
Luhman,95 (a 1983 accident) the injured parties were, similarly,
seeking underinsured motorist coverage under separate policies.
Neither were allowed to recover under the policies at issue.
In Linder,194 a minor was injured when struck by a pickup truck
driven by her brother and owned by her father. All were residents
of the same household. 195 Linder recovered the liability coverage of
the separately insured pickup truck and then sought to recover
UIM benefits from two other policies issued to her father. 196 She
was denied UIM coverage on the basis of the family auto exclusion
despite the fact that she was seeking coverage under a different policy.

198

In American Family Mutual Insurance Company v. Luhman,

Luhman was injured when the car in which he was a passenger collided with a train. The car was driven by his mother, but it was insured by his step-father, Christensen.
Luhman, the injured person, lived with his mother and stepfather. Luhman had his own insurance policy on his own car.
Luhman sought to recover UIM benefits for the 1983 accident under his own insurance policy. The court of appeals denied his
192. 364 N.W.2d 481 (Minn. Ct. App.), rev. denied, (Minn. 1985).
193. 438 N.W.2d 453 (Minn. Ct. App.), rev. denied, (Minn. 1989).
194. Linder, 364 N.W.2d at 482.
195. See id.
196. Id. Note the impact of the identity of the tortfeasor and the potential for
"subrogation." An underinsured (or uninsured) motorist insurer who makes
payments to its insured is thereafter entitled to subrogate for its payments against
the tortfeasors responsible for the injury. See Schmidt v. Clothier, 338 N.W.2d 256,
261 (Minn. 1983). In Linder, Linder's father, as owner of the vehicle, was vicariously liable for the negligent driving of his son under MINN. STAT. § 170.54. See
Linder,364 N.W.2d at 483. If the UIM coverage would have been payable (despite
the "family auto exclusion") the next step could have been the subrogation by father's insurer against father as torffeasor. The very prospect of such a subrogation
action underscores how allowing UIM recovery in that case would have "converted" the UIM coverage into additional liability coverage for father or members
of his family. The court referred to Linder and also to Eisenschenk v. Millers Mut.
Ins. Co., 353 N.W.2d 662 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), stating:
In each case it was within the insured's power to purchase sufficient liability coverage to adequately protect himself and his other insureds.
Each sought, instead, to look to his underinsured motorist coverages
when liability coverage was exhausted. However, in each case, an exclusionary clause prevented him from doing so.
See id.
197. See id.
198. 438 N.W.2d 453 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), rev. denied, (Minn. June 21, 1989).
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claim of entitlement stating: "As this court explained in Linder, if
the named insured wants substantial coverage when family members are injured while occupying... the named insured's vehicle, it
is incumbent on the named insured to purchase sufficient liability
insurance to cover such injuries.

' 99

But what of the fact that his

mother, and not the policyholder step-father, owned the vehicle?
The court replied: "[w]hether Christensen or his wife owned the
vehicle, the fact remains that Luhman is attempting to recover first
party benefits from policies covering the person at fault where his
appropriate remedy is to seek third party benefits from those parties.""
2.

Multiple Torffeasors

If there is another motoring tortfeasor, unrelated to the claimant, there is no obstacle to collecting both the liability coverage and
the underinsured motorist coverage under one single policy because there are then two distinct, separately insured "risks." One
such risk involves the liability claim. If there is a second, unrelated
vehicle which is also at fault, that other unrelated vehicle involves a
separate risk. If that other vehicle were uninsured, UM coverage
would be triggered. If the other vehicle were inadequately insured,
it would trigger precisely the underinsured motorist "risk" for
which the UIM coverage was issued.
-201
Lahr v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company, (Lahr 1)
held that a passenger injured in a multi-vehicle accident may recover underinsured motorist benefits from the insurer of the occupied vehicle if that other driver was underinsured. Lahr I seemed
to recognize that there would be two separate tortfeasors, one triggering the BI coverage and one potentially triggering the underinsured (UIM) coverage.
After remand, fault percentages were assigned to both motorists.' °2 The court of appeals in Lahr II qualified Lahr I by concluding that the determination of whether that other motorist is underinsured must be based upon that other vehicle's percentage of

199. See Luhman, 438 N.W.2d at 456 (quoting Linder, 364 N.W.2d at 483).
200. Id.
201. 528 N.W.2d 257 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). This case is identified as Lahr Ito
distinguish it from Lahr II, Lahr v. American Fain. Ins. Co., 551 N.W.2d 732 (Minn.
Ct. App.), rev. denied, (Minn. 1996).
202. See LahrII, 551 N.W.2d at 732.
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fault. °s Lahr II agreed that the UIM could apply but refused to allow the application of joint and several liability principles to deter204
mine the UIM exposure.224
Jensen v. United Fire and Casualty Company

involved a claim for

underinsured motorist coverage by a passenger in a one-car
(pickup) accident. It might seem an unlikely case to discuss under
the heading of "Multiple Tortfeasors," but the case essentially raises
the question of whether the owner is a separate tortfeasor.
In'Jensen, the tortfeasor-driver was the claimant's sister. 2 0 The

claimant and her sister lived with their father, RogerJensen.
pickup truck was owned by the driver's boyfriend.

2°

'

The

The boy-

friend's liability insurer and the father's liability insurer paid their
BI limits.209 The driver was an "omnibus insured" entitled to liabil-

ity coverage under father's policy when driving "non-owned" vehicles such as the pickup truck. The claimant passenger sought to
recover UIM benefits on the father's policy. 2

That recovery was

denied on the basis of a "reducing clause" which provided that
"[a] ny [UIM] amounts payable will be reduced by: ... any payment

under the Liability Coverage of this policy."

Citing to Myers v.
212

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company,

the court of ap-

peals affirmed the denial of UIM benefits on the theory that allowing recovery would permit "conversion" of the policy's UIM cover213
age into liability protection.
Jensen presented an unusual fact pattern. The at-fault vehicle
was not owned by, furnished, nor available for the regular use by
either father or daughter. However, the daughter drove the vehi-

203.

See id.

204. See id.
205. 524 N.W.2d 536 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994), rev. denied, (Minn. 1995).
206. SeeJensen, 524 N.W.2d at 537.
207. See id.
at 537-38.
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. 336 N.W.2d 288 (Minn. 1983).
213. Jensen, 524 N.W.2d at 538-39 (stating, "[b]ut Myers was designed to apply
to all those cases where, as here, first-party UIM would otherwise be converted into
third-party liability coverage-regardless of the policy's definition of an 'underinsured vehicle.' The supreme court explained in Petrich that Myers... rests on the
principle that vehicle owners may not purchase first party coverage and expect it
to function as liability protection .... That rationale applies precisely to the facts
presented here.").
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• 214

cle.
The claimant thus argued that recovering UIM benefits
should be allowed because the owner was not trying to convert in215
expensive UIM into additional BI coverage.
To that the court of
appeals responded "[b]utJensen [father] did control the amount
of liability insurance that policy provided for the driver of the
pickup truck, ShannaJensen [daughter-driver], and he
216 could have
increased that coverage by purchasing a larger policy.
The inappropriate "conversion" was barred there not by the
"family auto exclusion" but by a separate "reducing clause." Nonetheless the essence of the court's decision focuses upon avoiding
"conversion" in much the same way as the court has applied the
"family auto" exclusion.
2. "GeographicExclusions:" Operatingor Occupying an Owned but
UninsuredMotor Vehicle or Motorcycle
What is the difference between a "family auto" exclusion and a
"geographic" exclusion? The court sometimes uses the two terms
to apply to the same exclusion. In both, the focus is upon delineating the scope of the underlying risk. Just as the family auto exclusion applied to a range of fact patterns, so too does the geographic
exclusion. For example, the geographic exclusion is like the family
auto exclusion in that it prevents an insured vehicle from also being considered uninsured or underinsured in other policies covering the injured person. It is unlike the family auto exclusion in
that the at-fault vehicle need not be the "insured" vehicle. Thus,
where the at-fault vehicle is owned by, furnished or available for the
regular use of the insured, either exclusion applies. If the at-fault
vehicle is some other vehicle, one neither owned by nor furnished
for regular use by the insured or a family member, the family auto
exclusion would not apply but a geographic exclusion may.
In a simple case of a one car accident injuring a passenger, the
family auto exclusion operates to prevent the negligent use of one
single vehicle from triggering both the liability and the UIM coverage. In that sense, there is one single risk which should be insured
under liability coverage. The family auto exclusion prevents recovering both where such a restriction is consistent with the automobile insurance system in effect.

214.
215.
216.

See id. at 537.
See id. at 538.
Id. at 539 (emphasis in original).
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1 905

A geographic exclusion is only partially concerned with preventing an owned vehicle from being covered under the family's
liability and its UM/UIM coverage. In its pure form, the geographic exclusion attempts to restrict the scope of coverage to injuries which occur only while occupying an insured vehicle. In a
more moderate sense, the geographic exclusion operates only to
deny access to a policy's UM or UIM coverage if the insured is operating another owned vehicle for which he should have purchased
separate UM or UIM coverage. Thus, the most common application of a geographic exclusion is to prevent the extension of UM or
UIM coverage from a policy covering specific vehicles so as to cover
injuries sustained while the insured is using another owned vehicle
for which UM or UIM coverage has not been purchased when the
injury is caused by some other motorist. Geographic exclusions
prevent the insurance from "following the person."
217
Nygaard v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company

discusses the geographic exclusion. In Nygaard, a consolidated
case, two minors were injured by uninsured motorists while driving
family owned motorbikes. 218 The parties stipulated that the collision in each case gave rise to tort liability on the other uninsured
motorist. 2 ' 9

That some other motorist would be uninsured is pre-

cisely the kind if risk which is covered under uninsured motorist
policies unless there is an applicable exclusion. One such exclusion provided that the UM coverage did not apply: "(b) to bodily
injury to an insured while occupying or through being struck by a
land motor vehicle owned by the named insured or any resident of
the same household, if such vehicle is not an 'insured automobile. -220
The Minnesota Supreme Court refused to enforce the exclusion. The court declared it invalid, reasoning that enforcing the
exclusion would be inconsistent with the policies embodied in what
was then the uninsured motorist statutes. The court stated:
The statute places no geographical limits on coverage and
does not purport to tie protection against uninsured motorists to occupancy of the insured vehicle. Since our
statute requires this broad coverage 'for the protection of
persons,' we must leave to the legislature the sanctioning
217.
218.
219.
220.

301 Minn. 10, 221 N.W.2d 151 (1974).
See Nygaard, 301 Minn. at 12-13, 221 N.W.2d at 152-53.
See id.
Id. at 12, 221 N.W.2d at 153.
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of any exceptions dependent on the location of an insured.
As we held in Northland Ins. Company v. West, 294 Minn.
368, 373, 201 N.W.2d 133, 135, "uninsured motorist protection is not coverage for vehicles but for persons, even
though it is contained in an insurance policy otherwise insuring an automobile. "If our interpretation of the intent
of the uninsured-motorist statute is correct, little room is
left for an insurer unilaterally to narrow the geographic
scope of the statutorily required coverage. We therefore
conclude that the trial court properly invalidated the exclusions in question as inconsistent with the requirements
of the uninsured-motorist statute. 221
Minnesota's subsequent UM/UIM history dealt with geographic exclusions in the light of the then-existing UM and UIM
laws. The following summarizes treatment of geographic exclusions leading up to the 1985 statutory change. The 1985 change
effectively reversed the Nygaard rule that UM/UIM coverage primarily followed the person. Instead, post-1985 UM and UIM coverage may be said to primarily follow the vehicle. Further, the legislature in 1985 enacted two specific geographic exclusions to the
statutory system which, by their terms, prevent the UM or UIM coverage from applying to injuries if the insured is occupying or using
other owned vehicles.
a. Pre-October1, 1985 Law "GeographicExclusions"
Before October 1, 1985, Minnesota courts consistently refused
to enforce policy exclusions which prevented UM and UIM coverages from following the person rather than the vehicle. 222
b.

Post-October1, 1985 Law: Statutory Geographic "Exclusions"

The 1985 law placed limits on the UM and UIM coverages
when applied to (1) other motor vehicles owned by the insured
221. Id. at 19, 221 N.W.2d at 156-57.
222. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 439 N.W.2d 751, 754
(Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (noting "the rule in Nygaard invalidating the exclusion still
applies in this case"); Oberstar v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 301 Minn. 406,
410, 222 N.W.2d 557, 559 (1974) (agreeing with the trial court's conclusion that
the stated exclusion was ineffective); see also American Motorist Ins. Co. v. Sarvela,
327 N.W.2d 77, 79 (Minn. 1982) (holding that the insured could collect UIM coverage on policies insuring non-involved vehicles when operating an owned but uninsured motorcycle).
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and (2) motorcycles. These two statutory prohibitions against recovering UM or UIM benefits based upon occupancy of other
owned vehicles accomplish a legislative "geographic" limitation
upon the coverage. Before the 1985 legislative changes which enacted these provisions, courts tended to emphasize that the UM
and UIM coverage "followed the person" with the result that such
geographic limitations were void as against public policy. The 1985
statute not only validated the application of such previously-void
policy exclusions and limitations but went one step further: the
statute provided that the contractual UM or UIM coverage simply
"does not apply" to injuries incurred while occupying such vehicles.
1. Motor Vehicle Owners
Section 65B.49, subdivision 3a(7) of the 1985 amendments
imposes a geographical restriction on the scope of UM and UIM
coverages. The statute is "designed to encourage motor vehicle
owners to secure insurance on all of their vehicles."2 23 The provision became effective on October 1, 1985. It provides: "The uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages required by this subdivision do not apply to bodily injury of the insured while occupying
a motor vehicle owned by the insured, unless the occupied vehicle
is an insured motor vehicle." 24
Subpart (7) effectively
overruled Nygaard as to the "owner" of
1-• 225
the uninsured vehicle.
As the supreme court noted in Hanson v.
226
American Family Mutual Insurance Company, the 1985 amendments
"reflect a broad policy decision to tie uninsured motorist and other
coverage to the particular vehicle involved in an accident."227 The
plaintiff in Hanson, who was operating his own uninsured motorcy228
cle, was, therefore, denied UM coverage under his auto policy.
As noted above, this provision only applies to the "owner" of
the occupied vehicle. Whether having legal title to the vehicle in
one spouse's name would prevent the statute from applying when
the vehicle is driven by the other is an open issue. Certainly, "in-

223.
1989).
224.

225.
(Minn.
226.
227.
228.

Roering v. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co., 444 N.W.2d 829, 831 (Minn.
MINN. STAT. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(7) (1996).

See Perfetti v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, 486 N.W.2d 440, 443 n.1
Ct. App. 1992).
417 N.W.2d 94 (Minn. 1987).
Hanson, 417 N.W.2d at 96.
See id. at 95.
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nocent passengers should not be denied coverage [as the] thrust of
the statute is to encourage owners to insure all of their vehicles,
which has nothing to do with passengers."2

The 1985 statute does not prohibit resident relatives from collecting UM or UIM coverage under their own policies if they sustain injury while occupying the uninsured vehicle. 230 Resident relatives of the owner of an uninsured motor vehicle may, however, be
prohibited from recovering UM or UIM benefits under policies insuring the owner's other vehicles under the "Family Auto Exclusion."
2.

Motorcycle Owners

The No-Fault Act's definition of "motor vehicle" has always excluded motorcycles.231 Motorcycles pose separate risks of injury;
motorcycle owners are required to purchase liability insurance but
not No-Fault, UM or UIM coverage. b2 Thus it is often the case that
motorcycle owners would seek recovery for their injuries after the
fact, seeking to collect on other policies where they were "insured."
As noted above, prior to 1985, because the UM and UIM coverage
was deemed to follow the person, the UM and UIM coverage from
an automobile policy could be accessed by the injured motorcycle
owner. That rule changed over time.
In Hanson v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company, the
plaintiff was injured by an uninsured motorist while operating his
234
uninsured motorcycle.
He had no coverage on his motorcycle
235
and looked to his American Family auto policy for UM benefits.

Hanson argued that section 65B.49, subdivision 3a(7) (which
made the UM/UIM coverage inapplicable to motorcycle accidents)
only applied to owners of "motor vehicles,"
. 236 and thus he could collect UM coverage from his car policy.

In essence, Hanson

claimed that the legislature intended to exempt motorcycle owners
229. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. v. Willey, 481 N.W.2d 146, 147 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992).
230. See Petrich by Lee v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 427 N.W.2d 244 (Minn. 1988),
reh'gdenied, (Minn. Sept. 14, 1988).
231. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.43, subd. 2 (1996) (defining "motor vehicle" as
"every vehicle, otherthan a motorcycle. . . .") (emphasis added).
232. See MINN.STAT. § 65B.48, subd. 5 (1996).
233.
234.
235.
236.

417 N.W.2d 94 (Minn. 1987).
See Hanson,417 N.W.2d at 95.
See id.
See id.
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from the statutory exclusion. The court rejected Hanson's argument and held that the statute applied to motorcycle owners as
137
well.
The court found the legislative intent to be controlling over
the literal terms of the statute."'
The Hanson decision left open one important question:
whether a motorcycle owner who procured liability insurance for
the involved motorcycle but not UM or UIM coverages would be
entitled to collect UM or UIM benefits under policies insuring noninvolved cars.
The question was answered in Roering v. Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Company,13 a 4-3 decision of the supreme court. In Roering,
the court held that subpart (7) did not prohibit a motorcycle
owner from recovering UIM benefits under an automobile policy
because he had carried the mandatory liability coverage on the motorcycle.' 40 The court distinguished Hanson by noting that in Han241
son the motorcyclist had failed to carry liability insurance.
For accidents occurring on or after August 1, 1990, the Roering
242
rule has been legislatively overruled . 4 Minnesota Statutes section 65B.49, subdivision 3a(8) now provides that "uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages... do not apply to bodily injury of the insured while occupying a motorcycle owned by the insured."2 4 As a result,
motorcycle owners cannot collect UM/UIM coverages on their
auto policies. They must either purchase the coverage on their
motorcycle policy or run the risk of suffering uncompensated damages.
3.

Motorcycle Passengers

Section 65B.49, subdivision 3a(7) does not bar UM/UIM
claims of motorcycle passengers. In Milwaukee Mutual Insurance
Company v. Willey, Mathew Willey was injured by an underinsured

237.
238.
239.

See id. at 96.
See id.
444 N.W.2d 829 (Minn. 1989).
See Roering, 444 N.W.2d at 32-33.

240.
241. See id. See also Johnson v. Western Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 540 N.W.2d 78
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995). Under the law in effect in 1988, if at the time of an accident the injured person was occupying a fully insured motorcycle, the injured per-

son was entitled to select any one limit of uninsured motorist coverage afforded by
a policy under which the injured person was an insured. See id. at 80-81.
242. See 1990 Minn. Laws ch. 504, § 1.
243. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(8) (1996) (emphasis added).
244. 481 N.W.2d 146, 147 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
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motorist while a passenger on an uninsured motorcycle driven by
his father.145 After recovering from the tortfeasor, he sought UIM

benefits under his father's auto policy with Milwaukee. 46 The court
of appeals held that Minnesota Statutes section 65B.49, subdivision
3a(7) did not bar the claim by noting that "innocent passengers
should not be denied coverage... [as the] thrust of the statute is
to encourage owners to insure all of their vehicles, which has nothing to do with passengers., 247 The court further stated in dictum
that "any exclusion under the policy [which would prevent coverage] 24would be inconsistent with the statute... and therefore invalid."

8

Whether an auto policy must afford UM/UIM coverage for
motorcycle passengers involved in accidents occurring on or after
August 1, 1990 is an open question. Several insurers have amended
their policy forms to specifically exclude coverage for injuries sustained while on motorcycles. Although subdivision 3(a) (7) will not
bar the UM/UIM claims of passengers under the Willey case, the
1990 legislature also amended section 65B.49, subdivision 3a(5),
the UM/UIM priority statute. The statute provides: "If at the time
of the accident the injured person is not occupying a motor vehicle
or motorcycle, the injured person is entitled to select any one limit of
liability afforded for any vehicle by a policy under which the injured person is insured.""'
The history of the treatment of "family auto exclusions" and
"geographic exclusions" in the UIM area shows the impact of different public policies. Even under the pre-1985 era, when UIM
coverage was deemed to follow the person and not the vehicle,
courts nonetheless applied and enforced the exclusions to avoid
converting the UIM coverage into additional BI coverage for certain vehicles. Applying the pre-1985 accident cases to modern
claims must be done with care to recognize that the post-1985 public policy links UIM coverage more heavily to the vehicle even, in
some instances, to the point of simply declaring the UM/UIM coverage may not be claimed as a matter of statute.

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

See Willey, 481 N.W.2d at 147.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 148.
See MiNN. STAT. §65B.49, subd. 3a(5) (1996) (emphasis added).
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IV. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO MAKING A UIM CLAIM: TIMING,
EXHAUSTION, NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS

Understanding the concept underlying the state's underinsured motorist system in terms of what is compensable is only the
beginning. UIM coverage is a supplement to the primary automobile liability insurance. That, in turn, applies to the tort obligation
of an insured motorist. There are really three parties affected by
any UIM claim: the injured motorist, the UIM insurer and the tortfeasor. All three have interests which exist, at one time or another,
in relationship to one another. The process of resolving the underlying BI claim has an impact upon the UIM claim.
For example, if the injured party fails to recognize the contingent subrogation right of their UIM insurer, the UIM coverage may
be forfeited as a result of how the underlying claim is resolved.
The UIM insurer may forfeit its rights against the tortfeasor if it
does not act to protect those rights, either by advancing payment
under the UIM before the settlement stage is reached or by failing
250
to respond to a Schmidt v. Clothier5 notice. If the UIM insurer does
pursue subrogation against the tortfeasor, the process which has
been followed between the UIM insurer and the injured person
may, in turn, bear upon the ultimate tort liability of the at-fault motorist. All three players are involved, in one way or another, in a
complex dance. Each party has certain rights and risks. Some of
those rights and risks are affected by how the case is handled, the
procedure followed or ignored.
Although certain of the UIM procedural aspects have been
rather definitively pronounced, there remain certain areas of uncertainty and tension within the system. At least one such area of
tension has its origins in the change from the "old" UIM law to the
"new" UIM law. 251 That has to do with the "gap" which results from
below-limits settlements with the tortfeasor. Yet another, one
which is just starting to emerge, has nothing to do with actual settlements but instead arises because the underlying tort claim may
be resolved so as to produce a judgment-a judgment which does
not seem to easily fit into the UIM doctrine.

250. 338 N.W.2d 256 (Minn. 1983).
251. As elsewhere in this paper, "old" refers to the UIM law in effect in 1983,
the time the Schmidt v. Clothiercase was decided. "New" refers to the current, post1989 UIM law.
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Timing of the UIM Claim: The Nordstrom Doctrine

Although there was considerable dispute over this issue for
several years, it is now clear that a UIM claim cannot be pursued
until after the liability claim has been resolved, either by way of tentative settlement (accompanied by notice to the UIM insurer in advance of the intention to settle) or by way of proceeding to tort
judgment. In Employers Mutual Insurance Company v. Nordstrom,252
the supreme court held that until there has been a recovery from
the tortfeasor, the UIM claim has simply not matured; a condition
precedent to bringing a UIM claim has not been met before one of
those two events. In order to preserve and initiate a UIM claim, the
claimant must either (1) pursue the tort claim to conclusion in a
district court action, and then, if the judgment exceeds the liability
limits, pursue UIM benefits; or (2) settle the tort claim, give a
Schmidt v. Clothier notice
to the UIM carrier and then maintain a
253
claim for UIM benefits.

The Nordstrom rule is entirely consistent with the nature of
UIM coverage as "excess" to any BI coverage. If a UIM claim could
be pursued first, UIM coverage would become primary liability coverage, which "would be contrary to the designed role of underinsurance and to the underwriting principles on which it is written."254

As far as the early stages of the UIM claim, at the point at
which the claimant contemplates settlement of the claim with the
insured tortfeasor, the law has become clear in terms of the procedures to be followed by both the UIM claimant and the UIM insurer. This paper will later address the lack of guidelines for the
subsequent dealings between the UIM insurer, the tortfeasor, and
the insured. There is a duty to proceed with the BI claim prior to
bringing a UIM claim but also a duty to notify the UIM carrier of a
tentative settlement, a right of a UIM carrier to "substitute its draft"
in order to preserve its subrogation right, and various other rights
and duties, all of which are interrelated. Several of those various
aspects of the UIM procedures are discussed more fully in the sections which follow.

252. 495 N.W.2d 855 (Minn. 1993).
253. Nordstrom, 495 N.W.2d at 857.
254. Id. at 858; see alsoJohnson v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 426 N.W.2d
419, 422 (Minn. 1988) ("Underinsured motorist coverage is not an alternative to
liability coverage.").
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The Nordstrom rule would provide that a tort judgment is binding upon the UIM insurer.25 5 However, providing that the underlying tort claim must first proceed to either tentative settlement or to
judgment may assume too much. Is every 'judgment" equally binding? What if the 'judgment" lacks some of the protection which
had earlier been afforded a UIM insurer? Those are the areas
where some further testing of the limits may be expected.
The Nordstrom case represented the first serious question about
whether the underlying tort judgment was binding upon the UIM
insurer. Justice Simonett observed:
The typical underinsured contract provides, "We will pay
damages which an insured is legally entitled to recover from
the owner or operator of an [underinsured motor vehicle]."

(Emphasis added)

See also Minn. Stat. section

65B.43, subd. 19 (1992). 25 The tort judgment establishes
conclusively the damages to which the claimant is "legally
entitled"; if such damages exceed the tort insurance limits, the excess is payable by the underinsurer to the extent
of its coverage without the need for arbitration. The underinsurer pays, not because it is estopped by the judgment, but because it has contractually agreed tos ay the
judgment less the tort liability insurance recovery.
This was initially challenged as dicta despite the fact that UIM
coverage is intended to supplement the inadequate tort liability insurance of an at-fault motorist. If the amount of damages for which
that motorist is legally obligated has been fixed, there would be no
need (or opportunity) to relitigate or arbitrate the damages issue
after a tort judgment.
Some of the reasons for the challenge to the new Nordstrom
approach were aired in the subsequent case of Malmin v. Minnesota
Mutual Fire & Casualty Company,258 as follows:
First, Minnesota Mutual asserts that an insurer would oth255. See Nordstrom, 495 N.W.2d at 858-59.
256. "'Underinsured motorist coverage' means coverage for the protection of
persons insured under that coverage who are legally entitled to recover damages for
bodily injury from owners or operators of underinsured motor vehicles." MINN.
STAT. § 65B.43, subd. 19 (1996) (emphasis added). See also MINN. STAT. § 65B.49,
subd. 4a (1996) (stating, "With respect to underinsured motorist coverage, the
maximum liability of an insurer is the amount of damages sustained but not recovered from the insurance policy of the driver or owner of any underinsured at fault
vehicle.") (emphasis added).
257. Nordstrom, 495 N.W.2d at 858-59.
258. 552 N.W.2d 723 (Minn. 1996).
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erwise have to pay any judgment obtained by its insured,
including default or consent judgments, even though the
insurer was unaware of the pending lawsuit. Second, the
tortfeasor's insurance carrier may have far less interest in
defending against the injured party's suit than the UIM
carrier. For example, if the tortfeasor has low liability insurance limits, the defending insurer has less incentive to
vigorously defend the case, while the UIM carrier's financial exposure is increased. Thus, Minnesota Mutual contends that the UIM carrier should have the right to intervene and protect its financial interests. Third, Minnesota
Mutual argues that it has a due process right to notice of
the lawsuit under the United States Supreme Court's
holding in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972). In
short, Minnesota Mutual insists that it should not be required to pay Malmin's UIM claim because it was not allowed to participate in Malmin's lawsuit, it never expected
that Malmin's injuries would result in such a large damages award, and it was never notified that Malmin intended to claim UIM benefits.259
The court concluded:
Although Minnesota Mutual's arguments have some
merit, a consent to sue provision is not a valid means of
protecting the insurer's interests. While we agree that the
insurer should receive notice of, and an opportunity to
participate in, the insured's personal injury claim, we do
not agree that the insurer can require its insured to seek
written consent
to sue before the insurer will be bound by
26
the judgment.

0

After Malmin it would appear that the Nordstrom rule has, indeed, become the rule by which tort judgments will bind UIM insurers. Such a rule is comparatively simple and may apply where
the tort judgment is the kind which follows full, fair litigation of the
bodily injury claim and defense by the insured motorist. The UIM
insurer in Malmin protested that it not be responsible for default or
consent judgments.
Even then, Malmin suggests that notice to
the UIM insurer and opportunity to intervene would eliminate
many of the concerns.
Perhaps that is the message from the
259. Malmin, 552 N.W.2d at 726 (footnote omitted).
260. Id. at 728.
261. See id.
262. See id. at 728 n.4 (stating that providing a UIM carrier with notice of
commencement of a liability suit "would permit the insurer to consider the nature
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court.
One of the increasingly common devices being used to resolve
the underlying bodily injury claims is a form of "high-low arbitration." That is an alternative dispute resolution device by which the
parties (the BI claimant and the tortfeasor/BI insurer) agree to
bracket the damages which might be awarded. The eventual award
can be no less than the "low" amount nor any higher than the
"high" figure. At that, the high-low arbitration agreement sounds
like (and probably is) nothing more than a settlement device.
However, most such high-low agreements are entered into in the
context of a lawsuit and provide that the resulting arbitration
award, somewhere within the bracketed range, may be reduced to
'Judgment." That is done in order to make the resolution binding
and secure payment. Would such a "binding" high-low arbitration
agreement which provided that the resulting arbitration award
would be reduced to 'judgment" satisfy the Nordstrom rule? Or is
that a situation where the label 'judgment" presumes too much?
Consider what such a device does to the concerns of the UIM
insurer. The moment the injured party signs the binding high-low
arbitration agreement, the upper limit of the tortfeasor's liability
has been capped. (Usually that is set at or below the BI limits.) Is
the resulting stipulated award figure binding upon the injured
party? If so, then if it is "capped" at a dollar sum at or below the BI
limits, perhaps the injured party has effectively waived UIM claims.
If the underlying resolution (via such an ADR device) is not binding upon the injured party but if the injured party may instead
claim that his or her damages exceed the capped amount, how can
that be reconciled with the obligation of the UIM claimant to do
26
nothing to prejudice the UIM insurer's subrogation rights?

1

Would it be consistent with the UIM system to ignore such a
'Judgment" altogether? Even if the award was considered of no
force and effect in terms of binding the UIM insurer to pay, what
about the fact that such high-low agreements provide a "binding"
defense to the tortfeasor? Doesn't the unilateral action of an injured party, to give the tortfeasor such a defense, amount to the

of the tort claim and the tortfeasor's liability limits, and thereby determine
whether to attempt to intervene in the litigation in order to protect its own financial interests").
263. The UIM insurer's subrogation rights were a prime concern in the delicate balancing performed by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Schmidt v. Clothier, 338 N.W.2d 256 (Minn. 1983). See supra notes 51-66 and accompanying text.
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same as signing a release?
The high-low arbitration agreement is but one of the current
devices being used, oftentimes with active pressure from the trial
courts, to resolve the tort claim. That pressure, and the current acceptance of ADR procedures generally, contributes to some tension
in the UIM system. How the courts treat them will have to be determined by the same balancing the Minnesota Supreme Court
undertook in Schmidt v. Clothier.2 The tortfeasor has interests and
expectations, usually relating to whether that tortfeasor will be released from further exposure (either to the injured party or to that
party's subrogated UIM insurer). The injured claimant wants to be
able to process his or her bodily injury claim.
To a great extent, the high-low arbitration agreement is much
like a "tentative settlement." Perhaps, then, the court will apply the
Schmidt v. Clothierconcepts at the time of the making of the highlow agreement, reasoning that once the agreement is signed, subrogation rights have been waived irrespective of the dollar amount
fixed by the arbitrator. In Schmidt v. Clothier, the UIM insurer's interest in subrogation was considered an important right.26 5 All of

those factors were juggled by the Schmidt v. Clothiercourt; the interests all remain with the result that further review of the impact of a
high-low arbitration agreement upon UIM entitlement will have to
consider all of the interests.
B.

The Insured'sFailureto Exhaust the Liability Coverage is not an
Absolute Barto Maintaininga UIM Claim: The Schmidt v. Clothier
Requirement

In order to recover UIM benefits, the tortfeasor must, of
course, be underinsured, meaning that the damages the insured is
legally entitled to recover from the tortfeasor must exceed the tortfeasor's BI limits.266 However, an insured need not exhaust the BI

limits in order to preserve a UIM claim.

In 1983, the supreme

264. See supranotes 51-66 and accompanying text..
265. See Schmidt, 338 N.W.2d at 261-62. In many cases it is "important" as a
principle without regard to the exact dollar significance. Gradually, the focus has
shifted to whether the UIM insurer has suffered actual "prejudice" as a result of
the injured party's actions. See American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Baumann, 459
N.W.2d 923, 926-27 (Minn. 1990) (explaining that failure to provide notice will
not result in forfeiture of UIM coverage if the settling claimant can overcome the
presumption that UIM coverage will be forfeited by showing that UIM insurer has
not been prejudiced).
266. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.43, subds. 17 & 19 (1996).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol24/iss4/14

60

19981

Smetak: Underinsured Motorist Coverage in Minnesota: Old Precedents in a
UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE

court in Schmidt v. Clothier held void UIM policy provisions which
stated that the insured could not collect UIM coverage if the tortfeasor's BI limits were not first exhausted. 67
In 1985, the Minnesota State Legislature tinkered with the idea
of incorporating a statutory exhaustion clause which would have
provided that:
The uninsured and underinsured coverages required by
this subdivision do not apply to any bodily injury until the
limits of bodily injury liability policies applicable to all insured motor vehicles causing the injury have been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements and
proof of such is submitted to the insurer providing the uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages.
This exhaustion provision was, however, eliminated during a
1985 Special Session. 2 0 As a result, the fact that the insured settles
with the torffeasor for an amount below the tortfeasor's limits will
not constitute an automatic bar to bringing a UIM claim.
Another question is whether UIM claims will be allowed in
every case where the insured settles for an amount below the tortfeasor's BI limits. Some below-limits liability settlements may be so
far below the BI limits that no reasonable person could consider
the tortfeasor to be underinsured. The supreme court's opinion in
Employers Mutual Insurance Company v. Nordstrom, discussed below,

suggests that the determination of whether a UIM claim can be
made, and the extent to which benefits would be payable, may be
dependent upon whether the insured has made the "best possible
settlement" with the torffeasor's insurer. 270 What constitutes the
"best possible settlement" within the meaning of the Nordstrom case
is also discussed below.
C.

The "Best PossibleSettlement" and Responsibilityfor "the Gap" in
Below-Limits Liability Settlements

In Schmidt v. Clothier, the court held that exhaustion clauses
were invalid. 2 7, At the same time, however, the court held that the
UIM carrier would be entitled to deduct the full BI limits from the
267.

See Schmidt, 338 N.W.2d at 261.

268.

Broton v. Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 413 N.W.2d 829, 831 (Minn. Ct.

App. 1987), rev'd, 428 N.W.2d 85 (Minn. 1988).
269. See id.
270.

495 N.W.2d 855, 858 (Minn. 1993).

271.

338 N.W.2d 256, 261 (Minn. 1983).
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insured's damages, regardless of the amount recovered in the li272
ability settlement.
The insured could not recoup the difference
or "gap" between the tortfeasor's BI limits and the liability settle2 4
2
the gap.
ment from the UIM carrier. " The insured had to "eat

1

The Schmidt holding was consistent with the excess nature of UIM
coverage; the UIM carrier only had to pay the damages which were
above the tortfeasor's limits. That, in any event, was the UIM system in place in 1983 when the court balanced the competing and
legitimate interests of the UIM claimant and the UIM insurer. The
rationale for this rule was explained by the Schmidt majority as follows:
Practically, the insured would have no incentive to obtain
the best settlement if he or she [were] assured of recovering the "gap" from the underinsurer. Use of underinsured benefits in this way runs counter to the agreement
of the parties... [and] might also lessen the incentive of
the liability carrier to make its best offer to the claimant.2 75
Three justices dissented.176

They suggested that these risks

could be avoided without imposing any hardship upon the UIM
carrier by simply requiring the insured to "negotiate the best possible settlement" and inform the UIM carrier of the proposed settlement.277 If the UIM carrier was not satisfied with the proposal,

"the offer should be rejected, the underinsured carrier should immediately pay the amount of the offer to the injured party, and
they should immediately proceed to arbitration."2 7g
In 1985, the legislature changed the calculation of UIM benefits from the old "add-on" (damages less BI limits) basis to a "limits
less paid" basis. In Broton v. Western National Mutual Insurance Company,279 the court felt that this change, coupled with the legislature's
rejection of an exhaustion provision, had "effectively codified the
position of the Schmidt dissenters, who had argued that an insured
who communicates the tortfeasor's settlement offer to the UIM insurer should be entitled to recover the gap from the UIM in272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
ing).

See Schmidt, 338 N.W.2d at 261.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 261.
See id. at 264.
Id. (Todd, J., joined by Amdahl, C.J., & Scott, J., concurring and dissent-

278.

Id.

279.

428 N.W.2d 85, 90 (Minn. 1988).
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,,280

As a result, responsibility for the "gap" was shifted to the UIM
carrier for all policies issued or renewed on or after October 1,
1985. If the tortfeasor was "underinsured," (i.e., the damages that
the insured was legally entitled to recover from the tortfeasor exceeded the tortfeasor's BI liability limits), the insured could attempt to recover the "gap" between the liability settlement and the
tortfeasor's BI liability limits from the UIM carrier. The 1989 laws
did not alter responsibility for the "gap." As a result, primary responsibility for the "gap" still rests with the UIM carrier.
281
In Onasch v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company, the court noted
that while an insured need not exhaust the tortfeasor's liability limits, "the injured party [nevertheless] retains the primary responsibility of negotiating a reasonable settlement with the tortfeasor's
insurer before turning to his or her own UIM coverage."2 82 The
court noted that this negotiation requirement was mandated by
Broton: "Indeed, the dissenters in Schmidt, whose position the 1985
legislature and the Broton court adopted, stressed that '[t]he injured party should negotiate the best possible settlement' with283the
tortfeasor's insurer before seeking the available UIM coverage."
What will constitute the "best possible settlement" within the
meaning of Nordstrom has not been resolved by the appellate courts.
The holding of Schmidt v. Clothierwas that a UIM claimant could, in
some cases, make a below limits settlement while preserving a UIM
claim.284 However, in Schmidt and the Hoag case, which was consolidated with Schmidt, it was apparent that each injury not only exceeded the BI limits but that the tortfeasor(s) had already paid
sums in excess of the BI limits.

28 5

The damages in Schmidt were ad-

mittedly in excess of $250,000 while the BI limits of $100,000 had
been tendered .2866 In Hoag, one tortfeasor had paid $22,000 out of
the $25,000 BI limits while anotherjointly liable tortfeasor had paid
$4,000 out of its limits. 2 87 The total of $26,000 illustrated that even

in Hoag the situation presented an underinsured motorist scenario.
The supreme court approved the settlement technique when it had
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

Broton, 428 N.W.2d at 90.
444 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. Ct. App.), rev. denied, (Minn. 1989).
Onasch, 444 N.W.2d at 590.
Id. (citations omitted).
338 N.W.2d 256, 261 (Minn. 1983).
See Schmidt, 338 N.W.2d at 259-60.
See id. at 259.
See id.
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before it clearly underinsured situations. But, are there liability settlements which do not involve multiple claimants and which are so
far below the tortfeasor's liability limits that the courts will not even
permit a UIM claim to be made? Can an insured, for example, settle with the tortfeasor's liability insurer for fifty percent of the available liability coverage where liability is not disputed and still maintain that the tortfeasor was underinsured?
In Nordstrom, the court noted that it had previously suggested
in Broton v. Western NationalMutual Insurance Company,288 that "some
of the circumstances under which a claimant with a tort claim
worth more than the tort insurance limits might settle with the tortfeasor's insurer for less than the policy limits," and still pursue a
UIM claim.28 9 The relevant language from Broton is as follows:
An injured claimant does not always receive the full limit
of the tortfeasor's liability insurance even though the
claimant's damages exceed the policy limits. The insurance may be exhausted by the claims of other persons injured in the same accident. Or the limits of the tortfeasor's liability insurance may be distributed among
multiple claimants in such fashion that no one claimant
receives the full per person limit. Questionable liability
may make settlement for the full amount of the tortfeasor's insurance impossible although 2the parties might be
able to reach a suitable compromise.
As the "gaps" grew after the 1985 UIM law took effect, underinsured motorist insurers were presented with UIM claims where
the amount of BI insurance "left on the table" was rather significant. United States Automobile Association v. Morgan, 291' an unpublished case, spotlights but does not resolve the tension caused by
such below limits settlements.
In Morgan, Morgan's husband was killed by a truck which was
insured with liability limits of $500,000 per person/$1,000,000 per
accident. 292 There was
of liability insurance available to
•,i $500,000
293
respond to a tortjudgment.
However Morgan chose to settle for
288. 428 N.W.2d 85 (Minn. 1988).
289. Employer's Mut. Cos. v. Nordstrom, 495 N.W.2d 855, 856 n.2 (Minn.
1993).
290. Broton v. Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 428 N.W.2d 85, 89 (Minn. 1988).
291. No. C1-96-1933, 1997 WL 360595, at *I (Minn. Ct. App. July 1, 1997), rev.
denied, (Minn. Oct. 1, 1997).
292. See id.
293. See id.
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50% of that amount, $250,000. 29 4 Morgan then made claim to her
UIM insurer.

295

USAA had $500,000 of UIM limits.21

USAA's ob-

jection was that, if the motorist was truly underinsured, USAA was
being asked to begin aying at $250,000 which was one half of the
BI insurance available.
USAA commenced a declaratory judgment action, arguing
that Morgan's settlement for half the liability limits was not
1 •- the
298
"best possible settlement" required to trigger its UIM obligation.
The issue presented a question of law to be reviewed de novo. Two
of the judges on the court of appeals panel relied heavily upon the
purely mechanical application of the prior Schmidt v. Clothier rule,
stating:
If United Services determined that the settlement was not
representative of Morgan's damages, it should have substituted its payment to preserve its subrogation rights. We
believe the procedures and limits for UIM claims, as currently set out in the statutes, Schmidt, Nordstrom, and other
cases provide adequate protection for United Services' interests in under insurance claims. 2 9
Judge Davies took a more philosophical view of the dilemma
faced by the UIM insurer in such a case.300 He agreed that the issues of UIM entitlement should, pursuant to Washington v. Milbank
30' be decided in
Insurance,
arbitration as opposed to declaratory
•
1
302
judgment. He commented further, in part, as follows:
I write separately, however, because precedent cases may
suggest that appellant should, in the UIM proceeding that
lies ahead in this case, be precluded from challenging the
reasonableness of respondent's tort settlement. I do not
believe that to be the case, for such result is wholly impractical and substantively wrong... I believe it to be implicit in our rejection of this declaratory judgment pro294. See id.

295. See id.
296. See id.
297.

See id.

298. See id. The court's footnote in Morgan reads as follows: "The phrase 'best
possible settlement' comes from the requirement that '[t] he injured party should

negotiate the best possible settlement' with the liability carrier before proceeding
with a claim for under insurance benefits. Schmidt v. Clothier, 338 N.W.2d 256,

264 (Minn. 1983) (ToddJ., concurring and dissenting)." Id. at *1 n.1.
299. See id. at *3.
300.
301.
302.

See id. (Davies concurring).
562 N.W.2d 801, 802 (Minn. 1997).
See Morgan, 1997 WL 360595, at *3 (Davies concurring).
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ceeding-and implicit, too, in the supreme court decision
in Washington-that an insurer must be able to challenge a
UIM claimant's improvident Schmidt v. Clothier tort settlement 303Y
by some means other than by declaratory judgment.
In musing upon the subject of the UIM insurer's dilemma regarding settlements which are substantially below limits, Judge Davies also addressed the change in UIM law following Schmidt v.
Clothier. The legislature responded in 1985 to the problems of multiple claimants and insurer insolvency, stating that UIM insurance
covered the difference between the loss and the amount the claimant actually realized from the tort claim. 4
In the post-1985 UIM system, Judge Davies considered that,
"[flailing to give UIM insurers the ability to question Schmidt v.
Clothiersettlements puts into the hands of UIM claimants an intolerable weapon; claimants are permitted to settle tort claims at a
discount (small or substantial) and, by doing so, impose a dilemma
on the claimant's UIM carrier." 50 5 Seemingly the majority concluded differently, suggesting that "substitution" was the only alternative. 0 6 In the wake of this unpublished, and divided, court of
appeals decision, what is an UIM insurer to do? Is the door open
for challenge to the "best settlement" in front of the arbitrators?
Or, if the policy does not compel arbitration, is that an issue for the
jury which decides the UIM case? These are some of the unresolved pressures, often vented by UIM insurers, which arise because
of substantially below limits settlements occurring in Minnesota's
current UIM3 0system, where the "gap" is presumably shifted to the
UIM insurer.

303. Id.
304. Id. at *4 (footnote omitted).
305. Id.
306. See id. at *3.
307. Judge Davies' concurrence goes further and suggests that there ought to
be two different types of "gaps," either "coverage gaps" or "liability-based gaps."
See id. at *4.In his view:
Gaps created because of exhausted coverage or insurer insolvency are legitimate "coverage gaps" resulting from a best settlement. But gaps created by settlements founded on uncertain liability or comparative fault
are "liability-based gaps" and represent settlements that do not meet the
best-settlement standard. A UIM insurer must compensate its insured for
a "coverage gap"-one that falls within its contractual obligation. But the
insurer has no obligation to cover a "liability-based gap;" those gaps are
outside the insurance contract.
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The alternative view, of course, is that the "best settlement" is
whatever the injured person believes it to be. In that case, the future significance of the "best settlement" as a precondition to making a UIM claim will be nonexistent.
More than anything else, the change which "shifted the gap"
from the insured (under the old law) to the UIM insurer (under
the new law) fuels the drive for clear guidelines. Whether and to
what extent UIM benefits are payable following a below-limits settlement will be the subject of appellate decisions over the next few
years. Hopefully, the appellate courts will fashion some guidelines.
Yet, uncertainty in the law weighs against the establishment of any
hard and fast rules. The very fact that the law is in a state of flux
serves a purpose: it creates an incentive on the part of the insured
to obtain the full liability limits or risk losing the UIM coverage.
This, in turn, reduces the likelihood that UIM coverage will become a form of primary coverage, contrary to its designed role and
the underwriting principles on which it is based.
V.

SUBSTITUTION BYA UIM INSURER: IS IT A MEANINGFUL RIGHT?

Schmidt v. Clothier ° . balanced the competing interests of the injured claimant, the tortfeasor and the UIM insurer. In doing so,
the supreme court emphasized a key element: a UIM insurer may
"substitute" an amount equal to the tentative BI settlement in order
to preserve subrogation rights.
At the time Schmidt v. Clothierwas decided, the right to substitute was not intended to prevent the UIM insurer from paying
amounts of damages which were within the tortfeasor's BI limits.
Substitution in 1983 was not necessary to shift back to the BI insurer exposure for the dollar sum of the damages less than the BI
limits. The Schmidt-era UIM system provided that the UIM insurance started at the point where the BI limits left off. If there was a
below-limits settlement, that "gap" was "eaten by the settling plaintiff." The UIM exposure was, in the event of a below-limits settlement, less than is the UIM exposure under Minnesota's current
UIM system. The difference lies in the amount of the gap. The
gap amount was, in effect, another deduction available to the UIM
insurer at the time of Schmidt. Today, the gap is an element which
the claimant seeks from the UIM insurer. What the UIM substitu308.
309.

338 N.W.2d 256, 258 (Minn. 1983).
Id. at 263.
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tion provided, at the time of Schmidt, was a method by which the
UIM insurer could pursue recovery of the UIM payment, that
amount by which the damages exceeded the tortfeasor's BI limit,
thereby reducing net exposure by recovering some amount of the
UIM payment.
Currently, UIM insurers are increasingly presented with tentative BI settlements which are substantially less than the BI limits as
a precursor to a UIM claim. The same dynamic which allows a
claimant to settle for substantially less than the BI limits has a corollary impact upon the UIM insurer. Specifically, the UIM insurer
protests that, to the extent the UIM insurer is expected to pay the
"gap," such settlements are unfair to the UIM insurer because the
UIM insurer must pay amounts which are the responsibility of the
BI insurer. The primary, if not the exclusive, response of the courts
is that if the UIM insurer does not want to be responsible for the
gap, then it ought to substitute.310 Presumably the thinking of the
courts is that if the UIM insurer substitutes, somehow the ultimate
responsibility for the gap will be shifted back to the BI insurer so
that the UIM insurer is not, ultimately, responsible for sums which
are less than the BI limits. 11
But just what is the right of subrogation of a UIM insurer after
substitution? Is it truly an effective means by which the UIM insurer may "square accounts?" Or is it, under the current UIM system, more illusory than real? This section, while not a comprehensive analysis of all UIM substitution/subrogation issues, raises some
practical concerns about the feasibility of UIM subrogation after
substitution. The conclusion is that, practically speaking, subrogation by a UIM insurer after contesting the validity of a UIM claim is
a comparatively hollow right.
What is UIM substitution? The UIM substitution is basically a
payment made by the UIM insurer in the amount of the BI offer.
The payment made by the UIM insurer is to preserve a subrogation
right; it is not a payment out of the UIM coverage. The full UIM
coverage remains intact to respond to the UIM claim. Some practical problems exist for UIM insurers when it comes to funding a
310. See e.g., United States Auto. Ass'n v. Morgan, No. C1-96-1933, 1997 WL
360595, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App.), rev. denied, (Minn. Oct. 1, 1997).
311. Minnesota law, even during the current UIM era, still provides that UIM
coverage is intended to supplement inadequate BI coverage. If there is sufficient
BI coverage'to compensate the injured person, resort to UIM coverage is not allowed. But should these rules apply where the result is to shift responsibility for
large portions of the damages which were within the BI limits to the UIM insurer?
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substitution: most insurance payments must be reserved against
specific coverages. Substitution requires a bit of creativity on the
part of the insurer to justify a payment which could be many thousands of dollars.
Beyond the requirement that the UIM insurer must make
payment in kind, matching the offer, the cases offer little guidance
as to the rights of the UIM insurer and the claimant after the payment. If the offer to settle the BI claim is not the offer of money
but instead is a structured settlement,112 the UIM insurer would
have to match that offer in kind.
As UIM insurers began to receive notice of UIM claims and
saw the insureds contemplating settling for substantially less than
the BI limits, they looked to ways to prevent paying. One theory
was that if the UIM insurer substituted there would be no "settlement" of the underlying BI claim, rendering the UIM claim premature. Put another way, some argued that if the UIM insurer would
only "match the offer," then the injured party and the tortfeasor/BI insurer would have to litigate the underlying tort claim to
judgment. This interpretation arose in response to the insurer's
frustration in being forced to "drop down" so as to begin paying at
the point where the tentative settlement left off. It did not survive
appellate review. Essentially, substitution by the UIM insurer
amounted to substitute performance. The result was that the underlying claim of the injured person against the tortfeasor was settled. What substitution preserved was the right of the UIM insurer
to subrogate.1 3 But before there is subrogation, the UIM claim
must proceed between the UIM insurer and the injured person.
Can the UIM insurer join the tortfeasor in that proceeding?
On the one hand, doing so brings all interests into the case. That
would result in a single determination as to liability and the
amount of damages which would be binding upon the injured person, the tortfeasor and the UIM insurer. Theoretically, the UIM
exposure is measured by the same factors. If the tortfeasor is a
party, there will be one single determination reached-avoiding
the risk that the same case, the same liability and damages factors,
may be weighed differently by two separate tribunals. Joinder of
312. A structured settlement is a settlement where the consideration is not a
payment of money to the injured party immediately but instead a contractual
commitment to make payments over time, typically secured by the purchase of an
annuity.
313. See Washington v. Milbank Ins. Co., 562 N.W.2d 801, 806 (Minn. 1997).
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the motorist to the UIM claim also avoids duplication of effort.
On the other hand, a frequent objection to joining the tortfeasor to the UIM claim is that a defendant is entitled to trial without
the jurors knowing, directly, that he or she had liability insurance.
And, too, the UIM claim is a contract claim despite being measured
by the same factors as the tort claim. Joinder poses some challenge
to all concerned. No clear rules have emerged to provide a uniform method of handling the divergent interests.
What of the risk of divergent outcomes, one in the contest between the injured person and the UIM insurer and another in the
subrogation claim by the UIM insurer? Is that a real risk? If two
separate trials produce roughly the same outcome, there is less justification for 'joinder" of the torffeasor. But is it realistic to predict
that the outcome of the UIM trial and a subsequent subrogation
trial of the UIM subrogation will bear any resemblance? There are
some practical concerns which cast serious doubt on that assumption, to the point where one must ask whether UIM subrogation is,
under the current UIM system, a meaningful remedy for the UIM
insurer which has paid "the gap" amounts.
The practical difficulties start with the issue of who is the "real
party in interest" in a UIM subrogation suit? Washington v. Milbank
Insurance Company314 effectively held that in any UIM subrogation
effort the UIM insurer is the real party in interest. Just what must
314. 562 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 1997).
315. See Washington, 562 N.W.2d at 805-06. Determination of the real party in
interest is a function of whether the UIM insurer has responded to a tentative BI
settlement or whether, on the other hand, the UIM insurer has made a presettlement payment to the injured party. See O'Donnell v. Brodehl, 435 N.W.2d
68, 70 (Minn. Ct. App.), rev. denied, (Minn. 1989). In O'Donnell the UIM insurer
anticipated that O'Donnell's damages would exceed the tortfeasor's BI limits and
decided to make a payment of the $25,000 UIM limits before the BI claim was
made. See id. at 69. In exchange for the early tender of the UIM limits, O'Donnell
executed an agreement assigning to Westfield, the UIM insurer, his potential
claims arising from the accident. See id. O'Donnell then commenced suit against
tortfeasor Brodehl. See id. Brodehl's BI insurer eventually offered $90,000 out of
its $100,000 BI limit in settlement. See id. When O'Donnell sought court approval
of the RI settlement, UIM insurer Westfield moved to intervene. See id. The trial
court applied what it thought to be the rule of Schmidt v. Clothierand insisted that
Westfield match the $90,000 offer or waive its subrogation rights. See id. at 70.
The court of appeals reversed, indicating that a UIM insurer need not substitute
for a settlement amount to protect its subrogation right if it has paid UIM benefits
before settlement with the specific purpose of preserving those subrogation rights.
See id. at 70-71. Westfield, the UIM insurer, thus continued to have a right against
the tortfeasor. See id. And, since its insured was willing to settle his personal claim
for $10,000 less than the BI limits, presumably Westfield could thereafter assert its
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the UIM insurer prove in its subrogation claim? Presumably, the
UIM insurer would have to prove all of the elements of the tort
claim against the defendant, both liability and damages. Presumably that means the UIM insurer cannot prove its UIM payment but
instead must prove the damages which the injured party sustained.
Doing so poses some interesting challenges. The UIM insurer in
such a situation will be put to the task of proving each and every
element of the very injury claim the UIM insurer likely challenged
in the context of the UIM claim. The defendant tortfeasor, in such
a case, would relish the prospect of using all of the UIM defense
ammunition (such as an independent medical examination obtained and used by the UIM insurer) in its defense. By attributing
the source of the defense material to the very UIM insurer which
makes claim against the tortfeasor, the BI defendant gains significant leverage in the contest of persuading the jury as to liability or
damages.
The UIM insurer contemplating substitution and then subrogation finds itself in a dilemma. If the UIM insurer defends against
the UIM claimant, the risk is that all of the defense efforts will be
used to impeach the subsequent UIM subrogation claim. And if
the UIM insurer does not defend against the UIM claim, the risk is
that the UIM recovery will be greater than it would be if the UIM
insurer defended itself.
Nor is there much solace for a UIM insurer who substitutes
and then prevails in the UIM defense. Consider the practical problems of subrogating to recover the amount of the UIM substitution
in the following hypothetical:
Assume the injured party presses a BI claim against a tortfeasor with $50,000 of BI coverage limits. Assume the injured party reaches a tentative BI settlement of $35,000
and gives the requisite Schmidt v. Clothier notice to the
UIM insurer who, to preserve subrogation rights, substitutes its payment for a matching $35,000 payment. Assume further that the UIM insurer "succeeds" in defending itself against the UIM claim as a result of which the
claim against the tortfeasor and hope to recover the $10,000 which was "left on the
table." The process followed, prior to the settlement, involved the injured party,
O'Donnell, as the real party in interest for all practical concerns.
In Washington v. Milbank, the UIM insurer used a "loan receipt agreement"
but did so as the instrument to document its post-BI settlement substitution. See
562 N.W.2d at 806. In that case, the court was not willing to ignore that the "loan"
took place after the tentative BI settlement rather than before. See id.
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jury fixes the damages at $30,000. In such a case, the motorist would not be underinsured and the UIM insurer
would pay nothing. But would the UIM insurer be able to
recover its $35,000 payment?
The hypothetical illustrates some of the problems of having
different dollar figures assessed to a single case in two separate forums. In this hypothetical, the $30,000 figure which was fixed by
the jury in the UIM claim may well prevent the UIM insurer from
claiming that its insured sustained losses in excess of $30,000.316
Nor• is it likely
that the UIM insurer could recover the $35,000 from
--317
its insured.
To the extent that fairness is measured by the proposition that
both the UIM and BI determinations would always be measured in
the same way and with the same results, there are practical problems to obtaining such symmetry in the system. Some imbalance is
to be expected. It is not realistic to assume an identical outcome if
the "same case" is tried twice with two different "real parties in interest," one the injured party and the other the subrogated UIM insurer. The issue is whether subrogation actions following UIM substitutions provide a meaningful opportunity for UIM insurers to
recover for the amounts of the UIM payments which are payments
for the "gap" amounts. Practically speaking, the difficulties faced
by UIM insurers in pursuing direct subrogation make recovery very
problematic. And, if the UIM insurer must pursue subrogation in
its own name against the tortfeasor in a setting where the tortfeasor
may use all of the UIM insurer's efforts to defend the subrogation
claim, it is not hard to predict that the UIM insurer will often fail in
its subrogation recovery efforts. Because of that reality, the question remains whether the "right" to subrogate in an effort at shifting the "gap" back to the BI insurer is more than illusory.

316. "Collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of issues which are both
identical to those issues already litigated by the parties in a prior action and necessary and essential to the resulting judgment." Ellis v. Minneapolis Comm'n on
Civil Rights, 319 N.W.2d 702, 704 (Minn. 1982).
317. Gusk v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 559 N.W.2d 421 (Minn. 1977) was a
combined UM and UIM claim. The facts made it somewhat unique, but the supreme court held that after a jury verdict, a UIM insurer may not demand a "refund" of substitute drafts paid out pursuant to Schmidt v. Clothier. Id. at 424.
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VI. THE SOURCE OF PAYMENT OF UM/UIM COVERAGE: OLD AND
NEW COMPARED

There is no secret that the 1985 legislative changes to the
UM/UIM statute radically altered the prior rules by which Minnesota law determined which policy and what dollar amount was
available to an injured person. Professor Michael Steenson, commenting on the 1985 amendments, explained:
The statutory priority scheme now applicable to uninsured and underinsured motorist insurance claims substantially restricts the availability of multiple uninsured
motorist insurance coverages. Stacking has been curtailed, and the statute now provides precise guidance in
determining the source of coverage for the payment of
uninsured and underinsured motorist insurance benefits. 318

In addition, the Minnesota Court of Appeals observed near the
time of the change:
Before 1985, an insured in Minnesota was permitted to
add together the coverage limits of two or more policies
when the insured's losses were not fully covered by one
policy (citation omitted). Commonly called 'stacking,'
this process of adding coverages together occurs when a
court orders the 'pyramiding of separate first party coverages attributable to two or more vehicles despite policy language prohibiting stacking. 19
Chapter ten of the 1985 special session laws became the 1985
changes to the UM/UIM statute. With only minor changes over
318. MICHAEL K. STEENSON, 1 MINNESOTA No-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
231 (2d ed. 1996).
319. Austin Mut. Ins. Co. v. Templin, 435 N.W.2d 584, 586 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989). Templin involved a short-lived form of "multiplied limits" or "contractual
stacking." That odd variant, not involved here, depended upon language in
commercial automobile insurance policies which was not silent or neutral on
'stacking" nor did the language attempt to prevent stacking. Id. at 587. Instead,
the particular language found there provided a form of contractual multiplication
of the UM or UIM limits. Id. At issue in Templin was whether the "multiplied limits" language became instantly void when the 1985 "anti-stacking" law became effective. The court of appeals stated that "We agree that In Re State Farm held that
Chapter 10 outlawed stacking. Nevertheless, even if Chapter 10 outlawed judicially
imposed stacking, it did not outlaw contracting for the right to add together underinsured motorist coverages." Id. (emphasis in original.) The court there concluded that "The 1985 Legislature outlawed the practice in which courts order
stacking despite policy language prohibiting it, but permitted stacking by agreement of policyholder and insurance company." Id.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1998

73

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 4 [1998], Art. 14
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

the next twelve years, chapter ten is the UM/UIM statute with
which we deal at the present. Access to underinsured and uninsured motorist coverage is controlled by the same statutory system.32 ' Thus any cases dealing with UM access or UIM access flow
from the same statutory system and, with rare exceptions not pertinent here, may be used interchangeably.
What is worth noting, in the context of this paper and its attempt to identify areas where the "rules" have been changed, is how
the pre-1985 cases laid down "rules" or interpreted policy provisions in ways which are at odds with the new statutory system. The
key philosophical change that occurred was discussed above: prior
to 1985, the UM and UIM coverages were considered to "follow the
person." After the 1985 changes, the risk (and thus the source of
the UM or UIM coverage) essentially "followed the vehicle." In addition, there were other more subtle, but nonetheless important,
effects of the 1985 changes.
"Stacking" of all potentially available UM and UIM coverage
was abolished. 322 Moreover, its underlying assumptions no longer
operated. It was no longer dispositive that a person was an "insured" under several policies (once as occupant/omnibus insured,
once as named insured and again by virtue of being a "resident
relative" with another insured person). After 1985, the legislature
linked UM/UIM entitlement and the source more closely to specific vehicles, and insurance limits decisions made by the vehicle
owners for themselves and their families.
Instead of aggregating all available UM or UIM insurance
(such that the total available was the total of all similar UM/UIM
insurance) the statute specifically linked recovery to the dollar
sums elected by the owner/insured. If recovery was allowed under
more than one policy, a different form of aggregation was specified, one whose goal is usually to bring the total available UM or
UIM coverage up to the total limit chosen by or for the injured per-

320.

Chapter ten was later codified as MINN. STAT. § 65B.49 (1996).

321.

See MINN. STAT.

§

65B.49, subd. 3a (1996).

322. See id. subd. 3a(6):
Regardless of the number of policies involved, vehicles involved, persons
covered, claims made, vehicles or premiums shown on the policy, or
premiums paid, in no event shall the limit of liability for uninsured and
underinsured motorist coverages for two or more motor vehicles be
added together to determine the limit of insurance coverage available to
an injured person for any one accident.
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son on their own policy. For example, if a person selected $50,000
per person of UM coverage, in most instances that sum was available. If the person were riding in someone else's automobile when
struck by a phantom/uninsured motorist, the injured person would
first collect the UM coverage on the occupied vehicle. If that was
less than the limit the injured person had selected on his or her own
policy, the person was allowed to supplement the primary UM coverage in order to bring the total up to the amount which had been
selected by the injured party. This was a lesser result, and a very
different result, than the pre-1985 "stacking" of UM (or UIM) coverage.
"Geographical limitations" were also imposed through the
statute. These statutory limitations reversed a body of law which
had allowed injured persons to access other policies even though
they were occupying or using a vehicle they owned but did not insure.
How does this set of 1985 changes play into any difficulties
faced in resolving UM or UIM entitlement questions? Although
the changes took effect years ago, there remains a large body of
UM and UIM case law which is based entirely upon the pre-1985
philosophy. The insurance policy forms in use today are somewhat
different from those in use before the 1985 changes. However
many of the same terms, definitions, and exclusions remain. Those
terms have radically different meanings when interpreted with the
pre-1985 and post-1985 concepts in mind. Nonetheless for the casual researcher (or the advocate) there remains a body of law which
seems to interpret the same terms today for claims arising after the
1985 changes. In seeking to apply any of those cases to current fact
situations, it is important to note the philosophical (and even the
mechanical) rule changes since 1985. Some of the specific changes
wrought by the 1985 changes to the "source" rules for both UM
and UIM coverage are discussed below.
A.

Source Rulesfor UM and UIM Coverages
1.

Pre-October1, 1985 Law

During the UIM "add-on" era of 1975 to 1985, the source of
coverage for both UM and UIM benefits flowed from the very
broad definition of a "covered person" or "insured" person in the
insurance policy. Not only was a person covered under the policy
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1998
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insuring the vehicle they were occupying but, in addition, they were
often insured by name in their own policy and quite possibly as a
"resident relative" under the policy of family members with whom
they lived. An injured claimant could generally aggregate or
"stack" the UM or UIM coverages under any insurance policy in
which the
claimant was identified as a "covered person" or "in323
sured.,

Because of the potential for overlapping coverages, it was often
necessary to determine the order of priority among the various
coverages. In Holman v. All Nation Insurance Company, the supreme
court followed its decision in Integrity Mutual Insurance Company
v.
-_ 324
State Automobile & Casualty Underwriters Insurance Company, and
held that UIM coverages, like UM coverage, would be stacked "in
order of their closeness to the risk."3 25 The "closeness to the risk"
doctrine was summarized by the Integrity Mutual court as follows:
The nub of the Minnesota doctrine is that coverages of a
given risk shall be "stacked" for payment in the order of
their closeness to the risk. That is, the insurer whose coverage was effected for the primary purpose of insuring
that risk will be liable first for payment, and the insurer
whose coverage of the risk was the most incidental to the
basic purpose of its insuring intent will be liable last. If
two coverages contemplate the risk equally, then the two
companies providing those coverages will prorate the liability between themselves
on the basis of their respective
26
limits of liability.3

Minnesota courts have applied the Integrity Mutual rule in a
number of subsequent decisions. 327 The general rule which
emerged was that the UM and UIM coverage on the involved motor
vehicle would provide primary coverage. If the damages exceeded
the limits of liability on the occupied host vehicle, additional cover-

323. See Holman v. All Nation Ins. Co., 288 N.W.2d 244 (Minn. 1980).
324. 307 Minn. 173, 239 N.W.2d 445 (1976).
325. Holman, 288 N.W.2d at 251.
326. Integrity Mut. Ins. Co., 307 Minn. at 175-76, 239 N.W.2d at 447.
327. See e.g., Garrick v. Northland Ins. Co., 469 N.W.2d 709, 712 (Minn. 1991);
Doerner v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 337 N.W.2d 394, 396 (Minn. 1983);
Hennekens v. All Nation Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 1980); Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Crow, 451 N.W.2d 898, 900 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 439 N.W.2d 751, 754 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Levinson, 438 N.W.2d 110, 115 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989);
Boroos v. Roseau Agency, Inc., 345 N.W.2d 788, 790 (Minn. Ct. App.), rev. denied,
(Minn. 1984).
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age could then be "stacked" to compensate the injured claimant in
the following order: coverage where the injured claimant was a
named insured was second in line for payment and coverage where
injured claimant was identified as an additional insured by virtue of
resident relative or spousal status was last in line for payment. In
this manner, the insurer whose coverage was affected for the primary purpose of insuring the risk was liable first for payment, and
the insurer whose coverage was most incidental to the risk was last
in line for payment.
2. Post-October1, 1985 Law
The 1985 amendments created Minnesota Statutes section 65B.49, subdivision 3a(5), which established a two-tier priority
system that governs access to, and order of payment for, UM and
UIM coverages.
For the first time the statutes provided a formula-like approach to determining the source of UM/UIM coverage. Minnesota Statutes section 65B.49, subdivision 3a also plays a
role in specifying which insurance is, or is not, applicable to a given
situation.
The essence of the statutory source system is that every
injured person must make their UM or UIM claim to the insurer of
the vehicle they are occupying. If UM or UIM coverage is available
to the occupant of that vehicle, and if that limit is less than the limits which the injured person would otherwise have available, then
the injured person may make claim for the difference, the amount
by which the excess policy limit exceeds that which was available on
the occupied vehicle. For those who are not occupying a vehicle
(or those who occupy a vehicle which is the uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle) the statute allows the injured person to select
any one policy where they are insured.
The priority system was designed to accomplish two legislative
goals:
1. The system attempted to assign liability for UIM and UM
coverage to the insurance carrier which more closely contemplated the risk of injury. In this regard, the legislation
codifies prior case law which imposed liability upon the
insurer who was "closest to the risk," in other words, the
insurer of the host vehicle in which the injured person
was riding when struck by an uninsured or underinsured
328.
329.

§ 65B.49, subd. 3a(5) (1996).
Id. subd. 3a(6) - (8).
MINN. STAT.
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tortfeasor. The Minnesota Supreme Court has noted that
the 1985 amendments have codified the Integrity Mutual
doctrine.33 °
2. The system attempted to ensure that the minimum level of
coverage that would be available would be the limit of UM
or UIM coverage purchased by the policyholder. This intention is evidenced by the fact that a host passenger is
able to look to his or her own personal policy for excess
coverage when the coverage on the occupied vehicle is issued in an amount less than the insured's UM or UIM
coverage limits.
The statutory source system encompasses situations where the
insured is in his or her own vehicle, riding in another insured vehicle or even is a pedestrian.
a. Primary Coveragefor Occupants of Motor Vehicles
Following prior case law, the UM/UIM priority system creates
a distinction based upon the relationship, or absence thereof, of
the claimant to a motor vehicle. Primary UM or UIM coverage for
occupants of motor vehicles is generally provided by the insurance
policy covering the occupied vehicle. The principal priority statute, Minnesota Statutes section 65B.49, subdivision 3a(5), reads, in
part, as follows:
If at the time of the accident the insured person is occupying a motor vehicle, the limit of liability for uninsured and
underinsured motorist coverages available to the injured
person is the limit specified for that motor vehicle. 1
This statute requires that occupants of motor vehicles first look
to the insurance coverage afforded by the policy insuring the host
vehicle.3 2 Then, if the injured person's damages are not fully
compensated by the UM/UIM coverage on that occupied vehicle,
the injured person may, in certain cases, be entitled to "surplus" insurance protection under one of their own insurance policies.
If the injured person is an "insured" of the policy covering the
occupied vehicle, that policy will, with one exception, afford the
sole and exclusive source of UM/UIM coverage. No surplus cover330. Thommen v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 437 N.W.2d 651, 653 (Minn. 1989).
331. MINN. STAT. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(5) (1996).
332. Id. See also Davis v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 521 N.W.2d 366, 36869 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
333. MiNN. STAT. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(5) (1996).
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age can be sought. This follows from one of the principal purposes
of the 1985 legislative changes-to allow individuals to select their
own level of available insurance protection, (protection which was
tied to the vehicle) and to prevent the shifting of insurance from
one vehicle to another. Thus if an insured owned two vehicles, insuring one for minimum UM/UIM limits only but insuring the
second for higher limits, the use of the specific vehicle will determine which UM/UIM policy applies. If the insured uses the vehicle for which he or she chose the minimum limits, then that selection is respected: only that UM/UIM limit applies. The insured
injured while riding in a vehicle they own may not tap into
UM/UIM on any other vehicle. This is also closely related to the
purpose behind the statute-that UM/UIM coverages do not apply
if the insured sustains bodily injury while occupying a motor vehicle owned by the insured, unless the occupied vehicle is an insured vehile and do not apply if the insured sustains bodily injury while occupying a motorcycle owned by the insured. 35
The principle is the same: the insuring selection made by the
insured for that particular vehicle will be enforced. If the insured
selected no coverage, he or she will not be allowed to shift the
UM/UIM risk to another policy on a non-involved vehicle. Unless
the insured chose to purchase UM/UIM coverage for a motorcycle
owned by the insured, the owner may not shift that risk to the insurance on a non-involved automobile. These rules are consistent
with the Minnesota legislature's 1985 action forbidding the "stacking" of UM/UIM coverages. 336 It is consistent with the elimination
of stacking that the insurance selection for the particular owned
vehicle is enforced.
b.

Surplus Coveragefor Occupants of Motor Vehicles
--

337

In LaFave v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company,
Mrs. LaFave was injured by an uninsured motorist while a passen338
3
ger in her husband's vehicle. Mr. LaFave was also injured. 9 The
334. Id. subd. 3a(7) & (8) (emphasis added)
335. Id. subd. 3a(8) (emphasis added).
336. Id. subd. 3a(6). The court of appeals noted that the statute which became the current "source" system "is an absolute prohibition on stacking of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage . ..

Co., 392
337.
338.
339.

."

In re State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.

N.W.2d 558, 566 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
510 N.W.2d 16 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
LaFave,510 N.W.2d at 17.
See id.
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vehicle was insured by St. Paul Fire & Marine under a policy issued
to Mr. LaFave that afforded a single UM limit of $100,000. ° Mrs.
LaFave was not a named insured under that policy but qualified as
an insured because she was a resident spouse and because she was
occupying the vehicle.34 The LaFaves settled the UM claim with St.
Paul Fire for $81,250 and Mrs. LaFave then sought surplus UM
coverage from State Farm under a policy issued to her which afforded $50,000 of UM coverage. 342 The court of appeals held that
Mrs. LaFave could not recover surplus coverage under section 65B.49, subdivision 3a(5) because she qualified as an
insured
-•341
under the St. Paul Fire policy insuring the occupied vehicle. Why
could Mrs. LaFave not recover under her own policy? The answer
lies in the rules governing "surplus" UM/UIM coverage.
It is important to note that the statute only requires the injured "claimant to look first to the [UM/] UIM coverage" on the occupied vehicle.
The statute does not mandate that the policy
covering the host vehicle will always provide coverage. 345 Coverage
under the policy insuring the host vehicle may not be availableif an
enforceable exclusion,
- . 346 such as the family auto exclusion, bars coverage for the claim.
In such a case, the injured person may be
entitled to look to his or her own automobile policy for UM or UIM
benefits because there is no like coverage which is available on the
occupied vehicle. 47
The 1985 statute allowed passengers in host vehicles to recover
some amount of surplus insurance protection under their own insurance policies. 48 The ability to seek surplus UM/UIM coverage
was designed to allow policyholders to pre-select the minimum
level of insurance coverage that would be available for any given
accident. Without such a provision, an insured's ability to protect
and safeguard his or her destiny would be subject to the insuring
responsibility of other motor vehicle owners and operators over

340. See id.
341. See id.
342. See id. at 17-18.
343. See id. at 19.
344. See Thommen v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 437 N.W.2d 651, 653 (Minn.
1989).
345. See id. at 654.
346. See id.
347. See Davis v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 521 N.W.2d 366, 371 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1994).
348. MINN. STAT. § 65B (1985).
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whom the injured person has no control. Minnesota Statutes section 65B.49, subdivision 3a(5) states, in part:
However, if the injured claimant is occupying a motor vehicle of which the injured person is not an insured, the injured person may be entitled to excess insurance protection afforded by a policy in which the injured party is
otherwise insured. The excess insurance protection is limited to the extent of the covered damages sustained, and
further is available only to the extent by which the limit of liability for like coverage applicable to any one motor vehicle listed on
the automobile insurancepolicy of which the injuredperson is an
insured exceeds the limit of liability of the coverage availableto the
injured personfrom the occupied motor vehicle.34
The statutory system allows access to an insured's own policy
limit in certain circumstances. However access is limited to the extent that the insured's own policy limit exceeds the primary policy
limit. The full policy limit of the "excess" policy is not available except in the limited case where there is no UM/UIM available on
the occupied vehicle. If the full UM/UIM limits of the secondary
policy were laid on top of the limits of the host/primary UM/UIM
policy, the result would
be stacking. The 1985 statutes prohibited
50
stacking of UM/UIM.1

Minnesota allows the insured to "supplement" the amount of
UM/UIM available on the host/primary policy in order to bring
the total amount of UM/UIM up to the level selected by the insured. Such a system respects the selection made by the insured
while also recognizing that the UM/UIM coverage follows the vehicle with the result that "primary" UM/UIM coverage is that written
for the occupied vehicle. For example, if an individual selects and
pays for $50,000/$100,000 of UM or UIM coverage, that amount
should usually be available. If that individual were injured while
occupying a friend's car (which friend insured for UM/UIM coverage only to the minimum amount of $25,000/$50,000) when struck
by a phantom or uninsured motorist, the statute determines the
source (s) of UM coverage as follows:
1. First the insured collects the host vehicle's $25,000 as the
"primary" UM policy.
2. Second, if the injuries exceed that sum, the insured may
turn
to
his/her
own
pre-selected
limit
of
349.
350.

Id. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(5) (emphasis added).
See id. subd. 3a(6).
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$50,000/$100,000. Because that insured selected $50,000
of UM coverage per person, and because he or she has
available $25,000 per person on the host vehicle, there is
a maximum of $25,000 more of UM coverage available
from the injured person's own policy. ($50,000 surplus
limit reduced by the limit on the host/primary policy.)
The net effect of "supplementing" the host vehicle's
UM/UIM limit is to bring the total up to the selected
level.
To this extent, then, UM and UIM coverage may be described
as a form of "limits less limits" coverage. That term originally referred to reducing the UIM limits by the BI limits. That is not
Minnesota's current system. However, it is an apt description of
the working of Minnesota's UM/UIM "surplus" system.
Surplus coverage is generally available only when the limit of
UM or UIM coverage on the host vehicle is less than the limits afforded to the occupant under a separate insurance policy. 35 '

It is

not available where the occupant's per person UM/UIM limits are
equal2 to or less than the per person limits on the occupied vehi35

cle.

If the full per person UM/UIM limits of the primary coverage
are available to indemnify the injured person, the injured person
should not be able to collect excess UM or UIM coverage unless his
or her damages exceed the primary UM/UIM carrier's maximum
353
exposure.
The statute also makes it clear that if the injured person settles with the primary UM or UIM carrier for an amount less
than the available limits, the injured person will not be entitled to
recover the "gap" 35 4 between the primary UM/UIM limits and the
settlement amount from the surplus UM/UIM carrier. Excess coverage is available only to the extent its limit exceeds the limit of liability of the coverage available to the injured person from the oc351.

See LaFave v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 510 N.W.2d 16, 19 (Minn. Ct.

App. 1993).
352. See id.
353. See e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Crow, 451 N.W.2d 898, 901 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1990).
354. "Gap" here is different from that which results from an injured person's
electing to settle for less than the full BI limits. The "gap" here results from the
statute's specifying that the surplus UM or UIM is available to the extent that the
surplus "limit" exceeds the primary "limit." The gap is not created by policy language or by the decisions of the claimant when settling. The "gap" exists, if at all,
only because the serendipitous coverage on the occupied vehicle is less than the
pre-selected UM/UIM limit of the injured person's own (surplus) policy.
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cupied motor vehicle. The insured will have to "eat the gap" between the primary coverage limits and the amount of the settlement.
The statute does not, however, necessarily require that the full
UM or UIM limits on the occupied vehicle be set off against the
surplus limits in all cases. The statute only authorizes the reduction
of the excess coverage limits by the amount of coverage which was
actually "available" on the occupied vehicle. The statute expressly
states that an injured person may look to his own UIM or UM protection if its limit "exceeds the limit of liability of the coverage
available to the injured person from the occupied motor vehicle."
The UM/UIM limits on the occupied vehicle may not be "available" to the injured person for a number of reasons:
1. The primary limits may be non-existent as a result of an
enforceable exclusion to coverage. For example, the host
vehicle's UIM coverage will not be "available" if the host
vehicle is the underinsured motor vehicle. 56
2. The primary UM/UIM limits may be exhausted or depleted by other persons injured in the same accident.
The surplus coverage provision was designed to allow policyholders the opportunity to pre-select the minimum level of insurance coverage that would be available for any given accident. In
order to ensure that this purpose is not defeated, the excess carrier
should only be entitled to set-off the amount of primary UM/UIM
coverage that was actually available to the injured person.
It would seem that the Minnesota UM/UIM system is preserved if the surplus UM/UIM carrier is given credit for the
amount of the host/primary UM/UIM which was legitimately
"available" to the insured. In other words, if the insured was one of
several injured in a vehicle, and if the host vehicle's UM limits were
fairly divided, then the surplus UM/UIM insurer is responsible for
a maximum of its limit less the amount that was "available" to the
insured from the host vehicle. It is unfair to the insured who selected and paid for a policy limit to eliminate that coverage.
355. MINN. STAT. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(5) (1996) (emphasis added).
356. See, e.g., Thommen v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 437 N.W.2d 651, 654
(Minn. 1989) (finding that the policy definition of "underinsured motor vehicle"
did not include a vehicle furnished for the use of a third party); Davis v. American
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 521 N.W.2d 366 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that allowing an injured person "to recover both liability and UIM under the same policy...
would, in essence, be allowing an individual to increase liability coverage by purchasing less expensive underinsured coverage").
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At the same time, however, the same sense of fairness would
prohibit the insured from "gerrymandering" the host vehicle's UM
or UIM coverage so as to unfairly prejudice the secondary UM or
UIM insurer. For example, it would seem improper for the multiple occupants of an insured vehicle to divide the primary UM/UIM
limits so as to unfairly reduce the credit due to certain surplus insurers. In such a case, it is entirely possible that the court would
follow the "limits less limits" approach. In that event, the gerrymandering insured could end up with nothing from the surplus
carrier as a result of overreaching.
Any allocation of the primary UM/UIM limits among multiple
claimants must not be done to the prejudice of the surplus insurance carrier. 57 Although there is no case law which so provides,
wisdom (and extension of the Schmidt v. Clothier'5 reasoning) suggests that the excess carrier should be provided with notice of the
tentative allocation prior to releasing the primary carrier so as not
to prejudice the excess carrier's rights.
c. Primary Coveragefor Pedestrians (those not occupying a motor
vehicle)
If the injured person was not "occupying" a motor vehicle or
motorcycle at the time of the accident, the injured person will seek
benefits under a different source rule. In that event, the injured
person is entitled to claim against one policy limit amount under
any one policy wherein he or she "is insured." Minnesota Statutes
section 65B.49, subdivision 3a(5) states, in part:
If at the time of the accident the injured person is not occupying a motor vehicle or motorcycle, the injured person
is entitled to select any one limit of liability for any one
vehicle afforded by a policy under which the injured person is insured.359
By incorporating the statutory definition of "insured" into
357. See generally Eckblad v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 371 N.W.2d 78, 81
(Minn. Ct. App.) (holding that "[t]he remaining nonsettling parties are still entitled to pay uninsured motorist coverage in the proportion they would have paid
had [the primary insurer] not settled."]), rev. denied, (Minn. 1985); see also Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Crow, 451 N.W.2d 898, 901 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that
"[w]here a plaintiff settles with a defendant who may be liable for the plaintiffs
damages, the settlement cannot be done to the prejudice of the remaining nonsettling defendants.").
358. 338 N.W.2d 256, 261 (Minn. 1983).
359. MiNN.STAT. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(5) (1996).
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subpart (5), the legislature probably intended the term to serve as a
means of identifying the policy which will provide UM/UIM coverage when there is more than one policy of insurance covering
members of the same family unit. The statutory definition serves
the identical function under the economic loss benefits priority system of Minnesota Statutes section 65B.47.'60 The comments of the
Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act (UMVARA),
upon which the No-Fault Act was modeled, are illustrative:
This qualification [of not being named as an insured under another policy] serves to ameliorate the problems of
identifying the policy which provides coverage where
there is more than one basic plan of reparation
security
61
covering members of the same family unit.
The Minnesota Supreme Court used the UMVARA rationale in
a case where the injured claimant sought economic loss coverage as
an additional insured while identified by name in his own plan of
reparation security. In Bock v. Mutual Service Casualty Company, the
case consolidated with and reported in Wasche v. Milbank Mutual
Insurance Company,16 the court held that the statutory definition of
"insured" precluded Clark Bock from collecting basic economic
loss benefits under his father's policy because Clark was identified
as a named insured in his own policy.'6t The court, therefore, refused to consider Clark an "insured" under his father's policy
within the meaning of section 65B.47, subdivision 4(a) which provided that the "security for payment of basic economic loss benefits
applicable to injury to an
"364insured is the security under which the injured person is an insured
Bock may provide sufficient support for interpreting the term
"insured" in the UIM and UM priorities system to serve as a means
of identifying and assigning UM and UIM coverage to the appropriate insurer under subdivision 3a(5). Although Bock involved a
different priority system, the need for consistency between the
various types of benefits mandated by the Act has been a continuing focus of Minnesota courts. Applying Bock would promote the
legislative purpose of assigning liability to the insurance carrier

360. Id. § 65B.47.
361. UNIF. MOTOR VEH. AcCIDENT REPARATIONS ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 41, commentary at 45 (1990).
362. 268 N.W.2d 913, 920 (Minn. 1978).
363. See Wasche, 268 N.W.2d at 917 n.4.
364. MINN. STAT. § 65B.47, subd. 4(a) (1996) (emphasis added).
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which more closely contemplated the risk of injury.
The injured resident relative wishing to forego his/her own
policy, on the other hand, would argue that the insurer could have
clearly avoided coverage by excluding resident relatives who are
named as insureds under their own insurance policies. 16 However,
this argument begs the issue of whether the term "insured" in the
priority statute was intended to refer to the statutory definition or a
policy definition. If the former, as appears to be the case, it should
not matter whether the policy definition would cover the resident
relative: the question is whether the resident relative is even entided to access that policy. At the same time, however, for some of
the same reasons underlying the "family auto exclusion," there may
be circumstances when the relationship was so close that the decision to insure at a certain dollar limit may be considered jointly
made. In such a case, it is possible that the spouse may not be able
to access his/her own policy as a result of the interplay of the definitions of "insured," "underinsured motor vehicle" and possibly
policy language setting out the scope of the policy's application.
The "source" system accomplishes several significant changes
by which the "source" of UM/UIM coverage is determined in Minnesota. Applying pre-1985 cases to post-1985 accidents should be
done with some care to avoid confusion because the philosophical
underpinnings of the state's UM/UIM system were modified in
1985.
VII. CONCLUSION

Understanding the working of Minnesota's underinsured motorist system must begin with realization that there have been several underinsured motorist systems in effect in the state, each one
with different philosophical objectives. Although certain principles
have remained constant, some of the fundamentals have been radically changed over time. The result is that many precedents, and
the rules they embody, cannot be meaningfully applied in today's
underinsured motorist system. The careful balancing of rights
which led to the Schmidt v. Clothierprocedure for the beginnings of
a UIM claim may have to be considered anew with some questions
in mind for the latter stages of a UIM claim. For example, is substi365. See generally Burgraff v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 346 N.W.2d 627, 630 n.2
(Minn. 1984) (defining insured to include "any relative or relatives of the named
insured who is a resident of the same household").
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tution a meaningful option for a UIM insurer when the underlying
claim has been settled for a substantial discount? Should the UIM
insurer have some defenses to paying the "gap" in any case? As the
parties and the courts work to define rules by which the injured
person, the underinsured motorist insurer, the liability insurer and
even the at-fault motorist must relate to one another within today's
UIM system, they must recognize just what system was in place
when those earlier cases were decided. The challenge will be to
balance the legitimate rights and obligations of all affected parties
with the current system's philosophical objectives in mind to articulate rules which relate, meaningfully, to the behavior and dynamics
which the current UIM system creates.
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